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Introduction: The Call for a Marriage Amendment Throughout 2004 President Bush called upon Congress to "promptly pass and to send to theStates for ratification an amendment to our Constitution defining and protecting marriage as aunion of man and woman as husband and wife." [1] He claimed that the sanctity of marriage--afundamental, cherished institution--is under attack and subject to annihilation if same-sexcouples are allowed to join. [2] The President said he was forced to resort to the constitutionalprocess in order to protect this institution because "activist" judges were seeking to redefinemarriage without regard to the voice of the people. [3] One may agree or disagree with courtdecisions that provide equality for gay couples--like the Massachusetts gay marriage decision inGoodridge v. Department of Public Health--but courts that act to foster equality are within theirauthority and within accepted principles of constitutional democracy. [4] The Federal Marriage Amendment ("FMA") was introduced in Congress on May 21, 2003.[5] However, it was not until the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled that the state mustgrant marriage licenses to same-sex couples [6] that President Bush publicly endorsed the FMAand Congress actively pushed to pass it. [7] In 2004, the House of Representatives failed toapprove the FMA, garnering less than the two-thirds vote required to pass. [8] Nevertheless,those in favor of the FMA were in the clear majority by a vote of 227 to 186. [9] The Senate, incontrast, voted to stop the debate on the FMA by a vote of 50 to 48. [10] The fight is not over. The FMA was reintroduced in early 2005 after President Bush wasreelected. [11] Some Americans attribute President Bush's reelection to the same-sex marriagecontroversy that divides the country, [12] citing the many states that have amended theirconstitutions to deprive same-sex couples of the same right to marry as opposite-sex couples.[13] In fact, immediately following the election, the Human Rights Campaign (HRC), a nationalgay rights organization, announced a change in strategy to temper efforts to obtain marriagerights in light of the dramatic backlash. [14] Article V provides for amendments to the Constitution. [15]   "Amendments" are generallyintended to provide sufficient flexibility such that a document will survive over time and adjustto changing circumstances. [16] Thus, amendments to the Constitution should promote theprimary purposes of the Constitution and be consistent with three of the most basic principlesarticulated in the original document--individual rights, separation of powers, and federalism. [17]Although, currently, only the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has held that same-sexcouples have a state constitutional right to marry, the ability to enter into the marital relationshipis a very significant liberty interest, even if it does not rise to the level of a federal constitutionalright. [18] The FMA tramples upon basic notions of liberty and justice by expressly creating asecondary class of citizens and depriving them of that fundamental interest to marry-- infringingon both equality and liberty principles. Only one amendment in history, the EighteenthAmendment, limited the liberty interests of the people. [19] Needless to say, it also is the onlyamendment to be repealed. [20] Moreover, while there have been several proposed amendmentsthat would have limited the rights or liberty interests of individuals, these amendments have
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uniformly failed. [21] This Article will demonstrate that the FMA is not only strikingly similar to theseunsuccessful amendments that attempted to deprive citizens of fundamental interests and rights,but is even more destructive of separation of powers and federalism principles. The FMA isdesigned to overrule a state supreme court decision in which the court, as the sole protector ofminority interests, acted consistently with principles of individual rights to protect minorityinterests. [22] While the constitutional amendment process is the only "check" on the power ofthe judiciary to interpret the Constitution, the process should be used to overrule the courts onlyin cases where the judiciary abuses its power or decides a case in a manner clearly inconsistentwith constitutional principles. [23] History supports this view. The Constitution has been amended only four times to overturnCourt precedent. [24] Each time the amendment was in harmony with constitutional principlesand represented a proper exercise of the authority of the people as the ultimate sovereign tocorrect a court decision inconsistent with these principles. In fact, the Supreme Court itself hasoften suggested that the amendment process was the proper means of addressing the questionbefore it, because the Court noted that it did not have the authority to decide the questionproperly. [25] In contrast, the FMA violates separation of powers principles by prematurelyoverruling a state supreme court decision that is in harmony with our democratic constitutionalprinciples and depriving the U.S. Supreme Court of jurisdiction to address the issue. [26] Finally, the FMA flagrantly violates federalism principles by legislating in an area leftprimarily to the states. The federal government is one of limited powers. The Constitution grantsthe federal government no power over marriage; the states have the exclusive power to definemarriage within their territories. [27] Of course, the federal government has the power to protectindividual rights consistent with notions of due process and equal protection. [28] Thus, even inan area left exclusively to the states, the federal government may legislate to protect individualrights and establish a federal floor for such rights. However, the FMA deprives individuals ofsignificant liberty interests and establishes a federal ceiling on constitutional rights. [29] Thisclearly violates federalism principles and forecloses the opportunity for progressive stateexperimentation, an important aspect of our dual federal and state system. [30] In sum, the FMA is itself constitutionally suspect and is more destructive, on balance, of thethree basic democratic constitutional principles than any amendment previously adopted orproposed. The amendment violates every tenet of constitutional democracy by: (1) expresslylimiting the due process and equality interests of a minority group; (2) precluding the SupremeCourt from fulfilling its role as the protector of individual rights; and, (3) foreclosing the statesfrom experimenting with progressive laws designed to promote equality within an area uniquelyreserved to the state governments. By violating these tenets of constitutional democracy, theFMA is unlike any other amendment in our history [31] and must be rejected. This Article proceeds as follows. Part II discusses Article V of the Constitution and the limits
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placed on the constitutional amendment process, specifically, whether the Court may find anamendment substantively unconstitutional or require that the people, through convention, adoptamendments that infringe on individual liberties. Part III analyzes the Eighteenth Amendmentand proposed amendments that have historically threatened individual interests or rights, drawingparallels with the FMA. Part IV analyzes the four amendments designed to overrule SupremeCourt decisions and contrasts these with the FMA to demonstrate that the use of the amendmentprocess here is inconsistent with these past amendments. Finally, Part V discusses how the FMAflagrantly violates federalism principles by limiting individual liberties in an area left exclusivelyto the states, thereby depriving the nation of the opportunity to experiment with progressive laws. I. Constitutional Amendment A. Limits on Constitutional Amendments Article V of the Constitution grants Congress the power to propose an amendment to theConstitution whenever two-thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary; and such amendmentshall become valid when ratified by the Legislatures or Conventions of three-fourths of the states.[32] While thousands of constitutional amendments have been proposed since the founding, onlyseventeen amendments have been added to the original Bill of Rights. [33] The Constitution isdeemed a higher law than ordinary legislation; thus the amendment process requires asuper-majority consensus for passage by Congress and the states. The purpose of requiring a slowand deliberate process is to limit the number of amendments to those that truly reflect the will ofthe people. [34] James Madison explained that in a large republic "it [should be] less probablethat a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens."[35] The "people" are granted the ultimate authority over government with the power to redefinethe scope of its power by modifying the document that establishes such power. [36] Whether the Constitution provides for substantive limits on amendments is hotly debated.[37] There are strong arguments that some substantive limitations do exist. [38] The word"amendment" itself suggests limits. "[T]he power to 'amend' [does not] include the power to'destroy."' [39] "Amendment" implies change to the original document that respects itsfoundational principles, those "in harmony" with the "general spirit and purpose[s]" of theoriginal document. [40] Radical alteration to the foundational principles is not intended. [41] TheConstitution contains "'an inner unity' and a commitment to 'certain overarching principles andfundamental decisions to which individual provisions are subordinate."' [42] The preamble of the Constitution establishes the primary purposes of the Framers--tomaintain a union of independent states and secure justice and liberty for all individualsthroughout the nation. [43] The body of the Constitution creates a framework for government toachieve these principles by defining a federal government of limited powers, dividing poweramong three separate branches--the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary--and protectingindividuals from government abuse. [44] 
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This framework is founded upon three substantive principles that define our constitutionaldemocracy: federalism, separation of powers, and individual rights. These rights are moreimportant than the democratic procedures provided in Article V to secure them. [45] Thus, theuse of proper procedures to amend the Constitution in a manner that contradicts fundamentalconstitutional principles should be invalid. Nevertheless, the generally accepted legal view derived from the plain language of Article Vis that the Court has no authority to question the substance of constitutional amendments. If theprocedural requirements of Article V are properly followed, the amendment is valid. [46] Thereason for this is simple. The amendment process is the sole check on judicial power to interpretthe Constitution. Thus, if the judiciary could review the substance of constitutional amendments,it would wield unchecked ultimate power. [47] This is particularly problematic because itsmembers are not elected but rather are appointed and serve for life. [48] The judiciary, in fact, isdesigned to be counter-majoritarian and is not well-suited to express the will of the "majority."[49] Therefore, it is generally understood that the Supreme Court has no power to determine thecontent of the Constitution, but only the power to interpret that which the Constitution doescontain. [50] The arguments supporting substantive limits on constitutional amendments are useful inanalyzing which amendments are constitutionally suspect, even if the Court would be unwillingto enforce substantive limits. Thus, an amendment is constitutionally suspect when it is in directconflict with the governing principles embodied in the original constitution, for example whenthe value at stake is both expressly embodied in its text and has strong ties to other constitutionalvalues. [51] The express purposes of the Constitution "to form a more perfect union, establish justice . . .and secure the blessings of liberty" [52] establish two fundamental principles necessary to ourconstitutional system of democracy: the "union" of individual states and individual interests injustice and liberty. Amendments that would effectively eliminate or destroy the states would beinvalid as there would no longer remain a "union." [53] Similarly, amendments that destroyindividual interests in liberty and justice would be invalid as incoherent and destructive to thevery purposes of establishing justice and securing liberty. It is unlikely that any singleamendment would eliminate the states or destroy all fundamental interests necessary to maintainjustice and liberty. Such dramatic "amendments" would likely be the result of a revolution. [54]However, it is plausible to imagine successive amendments that would deprive the states ofsufficient legislative powers such that over time the states would cease to exist in any real sense,having been deprived of their primary powers. [55] Moreover, one could imagine successiveamendments that chip away at individual liberty interests such that, over time, the people wouldlack sufficient protections to maintain individual justice and liberty. The FMA is constitutionally suspect. First, individual interests in liberty and equality areexpressly enumerated in the Constitution. [56] The United States Supreme Court has held thatmarriage is a fundamental liberty right of the people. [57] The Court has not held that same-sex
-5-
couples have a right to marry: that is the debate. [58] Nevertheless, the FMA expressly creates anunequal system that deprives only same-sex couples of the legal right to marry, which, even ifnot a federal constitutional right to liberty, [59] is a significant liberty interest. Second, values ofliberty and equality, and specifically marriage, invoke other fundamental enumerated interests ofexpression, assembly, and religion. [60] Third, the power to define marriage lies primarily withthe states. [61] Setting a national standard for marriage that denies individual liberty interests is amove toward eliminating both state sovereignty and individual justice and liberty. In sum, theFMA should be invalidated as it impinges upon the substantive limits of "amendment." B. Constitutional Amendment by Convention While it may be improper to give the judicial branch ultimate authority over the content ofthe Constitution, no branch should have such authority alone. To give any one branch thisauthority violates the basic structure of checks and balances. Rather, the people created ourconstitutional democratic government during the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 and shouldalone retain the ultimate authority to substantially alter the document in a manner that isinconsistent with the basic principles defined therein. The people's will is expressed throughconvention, not by votes of Congress or the state legislatures. "'[C]onstitutionalism has oneessential quality: it is a legal limitation on government' . . . written by a special assembly ofcitizens and then submitted to the people for approval." [62] Only the people have the authorityto approve an amendment that limits the natural interests of the people themselves: the people,not the government, are the ultimate sovereign. [63] This proposition is supported by analogy tothe Seventeenth Amendment, [64] and by state courts, scholars, and politicians throughouthistory who have agreed with this view. [65] The people elect representatives to the state and federal legislatures. Once elected, theserepresentatives form the "government" and are no longer truly the "people." The SeventeenthAmendment exemplifies this understanding. The Constitution originally provided that "[t]heSenate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by theLegislatures thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one vote." [66] The SeventeenthAmendment requires that senators be "elected by the people" of the state rather than "by theLegislatures thereof." [67] A primary reason for the election of senators by the state legislatures was to protect theinterests of the states directly. [68] Madison explained that because "[t]he Senate will be electedabsolutely and exclusively by the State Legislatures," it "will owe its existence more or less to thefavor of State governments . . . ." [69] Thus, the Senate stood as a defense to federalencroachment upon states' rights [70] because the senators, since elected by the state legislaturesand not the people directly, would be dedicated to protecting their respective states. Implicit inthis rationale is that state legislatures, while representatives of the people, primarily protect theinterests of the State and only indirectly those of the people. The people soon became dissatisfied with the indirect election of their federal senators. The
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primary justification was the populist and progressive sentiment that the Senate was anaristocratic body, far removed from the people and unresponsive to their needs. [71]Furthermore, the people felt intelligent enough to choose their own representatives. [72] Thepredominant sentiment among the press, the states, and the legislators was that popular electionof senators would strengthen democracy and weaken elitism. [73] Giving the people power toelect their senators directly was thus a victory for democratic forces. State courts have recognized limits on the power of the government to amend theirconstitutions. For example, the Supreme Court of Arkansas has held that the Arkansas GeneralAssembly had no power to repeal any aspect of the Bill of Rights of the Arkansas Constitution.[74] The court explained that the Bill of Rights derived from a British statute that declared thetrue rights of the British subjects. The codification of citizens' rights operated as a limit on thepowers of the crown. [75] The court explained that the rights are sacred not only because of theirantiquity, but also because our forefathers obtained them as a result of the perpetual struggle forfreedom. [76] As part of the original state constitution, the Framers placed these rights beyondthe power of the general government to oppress the people. [77] Thus, only a convention of thewhole people, not the legislature, could amend the Arkansas Constitution to alter the sacredrights of the people. [78] Similarly, at the federal level, if an amendment will alter sacred rightsof the people, the people, by convention, should amend the federal constitution, not the congressand state legislatures. Scholars have argued that use of the convention method for adoption and ratification isnecessary when the proposed amendment makes fundamental changes to the Constitution,especially when the amendment will deprive the people of individual liberty interests. Elai Katzexplained his position in this way: A convention called for the express purpose of amending the Constitution would reflectthe will of the people regarding the specific matter at hand better than legislatures that mayhave been elected before the public became aware of the proposed amendment. Whiledelegates to the convention would be selected based on their position on a single issue, suchas the right to an abortion, legislators are rarely elected because of their views regarding asingle issue. In the eighteenth century, conventions were considered to be the highest expression ofpopular will; they embodied popular sovereignty . . . . Thus, in the eyes of eighteenth centurysociety and possibly present society, a special convention, convened for the purpose ofrevising the fundamental law, would be the best substitute for an act of pure popularsovereignty. Furthermore, conventions require a longer, more deliberative, and betterpublicized process. Since constitutional conventions are not permanent, ordinaryorganizations, their selection and debates are likely to be followed more carefully by thepublic than regular congressional sessions. Finally, delegates to conventions are elected forone particular issue--to support or propose an amendment; . . . It follows, then, that aprinciple-altering amendment proposed and ratified by conventions is more legitimate thanthe same amendment proposed by members of Congress who were not elected for the express
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purpose of making particular changes to the fundamental law. [79] Furthermore, throughout history, politicians have argued that the use of conventions forapproving and ratifying fundamental changes to our Constitution is necessary. For example,President Abraham Lincoln stated that a constitutional amendment that could potentially alter the"character of the Constitution," should be adopted by convention because "it allows amendmentsto originate with the people themselves, instead of only permitting them to take, or reject,propositions, originated by others." [80] However, the plain text of the Constitution enumerates four procedures for constitutionalamendment [81] and thus far the Supreme Court has held all methods equal. [82] For example, inSprague, the Court found that the Tenth Amendment did not require state conventions forratification of amendments affecting the liberty of citizens. [83] The Court held that the TenthAmendment reserves powers that are not granted to the federal government to the states or thepeople to protect federalism principles, not individual rights. [84] Interestingly, Ely Hart has argued that the Fourteenth Amendment may grant courts thepower to require selection of a specific procedure to amend the Constitution under certaincircumstances. Hart's vision of a representative democracy invokes two features: broadparticipation of the people in the political process and protection of discrete minorities. [85]According to Hart, the Founders understood the duty of representatives to govern in the interestof the whole people. Representatives could not, therefore, refuse to represent a particular group.[86] Under this theory, the Supreme Court has a right to review the states' Article V activities tomake sure that they comport with the Fourteenth Amendment. [87] Thus, the ratification processused by a state may fall short of Fourteenth Amendment standards, for instance, if the legislatorsdid not adhere to their duty of representation. [88] 
The arguments detailing the need for popular approval by convention when an amendmentinfringes fundamental interests suggests that the FMA should be ratified, if at all, by convention.The FMA limits natural interests that the people have in liberty, freedom, and equality, thus onlythe people by convention, should have the authority to approve it, as they, not the government,are the ultimate sovereign. [89] Moreover, because a constitutional amendment is by far the most important and substantiallegal step this country can take, it should be taken only after serious unbiased consideration andreflection by the electorate. A controversial amendment proposed in a time of political unrest isunlikely to withstand the test of time. Citizens will become dissatisfied with such an amendmentonce they have an opportunity to reflect upon it, [90] as demonstrated by the EighteenthAmendment. [91] The FMA was introduced at a time when this country was at war, having beenattacked by terrorists, and in the midst of a presidential election. Support for the amendment wasfueled by the political fervor of an election where candidates capitalized on the irrational fearsand prejudices of the electorate to create a divided polity and gain votes. [92] This is not an
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appropriate environment for proposing a controversial constitutional amendment since the peoplehave little opportunity in such a environment to reflect carefully on the ramifications of theamendment. II. Amendments and Individual Rights Independent of the procedural requirements of constitutional amendment, the FMA, unlikeany other amendment in our history, substantively violates the basic tenets of our constitutionaldemocracy: individual rights, separation of powers, and federalism principles. The Bill of Rights,[93] and later Amendments adopted by this nation, enumerate fundamental rights and protectthese rights from undue government infringement. The Ninth Amendment further protectsnon-enumerated rights by stating that "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." [94] The right to"liberty" and the right to "equal protection" under the laws are granted expressly to the peopleunder the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments [95] and reflect the very principles upon which thisnation was founded. The debate over same-sex marriage raises individual interests in both fundamental rights: (1)"liberty"--the right for same-sex couples to have the state recognize a committed monogamousrelationship between two individuals and bestow the benefits and obligations of this civilinstitution upon them; and (2) "equality"--the right for same-sex couples to be eligible for thesame benefits and recognition as opposite-sex couples who agree to abide by the obligationsimposed by the civil institution of marriage. Amending the federal Constitution to definemarriage as between a man and a woman deprives same-sex couples the ability to marry and isantithetical to principles of liberty and equality. Granted, same-sex couples currently have nofederal constitutional right to marry but the interest in marriage is an extremely important, if notfundamental, one. A. The Repealed Eighteenth Amendment Only one amendment, the Eighteenth, deprived individuals of a liberty interest. TheEighteenth Amendment prohibited the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquorswithin the United States. [96] Needless to say, it is the only constitutional amendment to berepealed. [97] The Eighteenth Amendment grew out of the efforts of the temperance movement,primarily motivated by religious Christian groups. Temperance urged moderation in theconsumption of alcohol so as to reduce its corrupting influence on public and private morals.[98] The struggle to prohibit alcoholic consumption first targeted the states. [99] In fact, thefederal courts limited the scope of certain state prohibition laws to protect Congress's power toregulate interstate commerce. [100] By 1912, however, nearly half the states had adoptedprohibition laws. [101] In 1914, the movement took the struggle to the national level, proposing afederal constitutional amendment to prohibit the sale and transportation of alcohol nationwide.
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[102] The amendment was ultimately ratified by the states in 1919, primarily in reaction toWorld War I. [103] Food shortages had led to conservation and prohibitionists argued thatalcohol led to the waste of precious resources. [104] Further, anti-German sentiment wasdirected, in part, at the brewery industry, which was largely run by those of German descent.[105] After adoption, the Eighteenth Amendment suffered from several problems. [106] Theseproblems have been explained as a result of an amendment passed by a small, yet highlyorganized and passionate interest group. [107] Because the Eighteenth Amendment did notappear to reflect true popular sentiment, people were not willing to voluntarily conform to thelaw and enforcement was very difficult. [108] Moreover, organized crime stepped in to meet thepopular demand [109] and drinking, in fact, increased among portions of the polity. For example,women, who had been banned previously from saloons under state law, drank in newlyestablished venues for alcoholic consumption. [110] The Eighteenth Amendment was criticized by reform movement organizations arguing theamendment "promoted hypocrisy, encouraged law breaking, destroyed the balance of powerbetween state and federal authority, and impaired individual rights." [111] These groups claimedthat the amendment advanced unsupported social views and invaded the states' sphere of power.The reformers perceived prohibition as a direct threat to state authority and local autonomy.[112] Senator Joseph Weldon Bailey of Texas thought that proposing a national solution to asocial problem set dangerous precedent. Bailey worried that such a proposal would lead tonational marriage laws, which would ultimately erase state lines and subvert the republic. [113] Interestingly, the amendment drafters attempted to limit the threat to federalism principlesand individual rights by allowing for concurrent state and federal enforcement of the laws andnot outlawing the personal use of alcohol. [114] While the interpretation of "concurrent powers"was controversial, the Court settled the meaning by holding that, while states could not pass lawsthat conflicted with the federal amendment, there was no requirement for them to enactsupplemental prohibition codes. [115] Moreover, strong beliefs in personal liberty and thesanctity of the home supported leaving the personal use of alcohol unaffected by the amendment.[116] The parallels between the FMA and the Eighteenth Amendment are striking. First, themovement to outlaw same-sex marriage nationwide is primarily led by conservative politiciansand Christian religious groups. Like the Eighteenth Amendment, the FMA is meant to protect the"morality" of our society. [117] Admittedly, the marriage amendment is more popular with thepolity than was prohibition [118] This is not surprising since it affects only a small subgroup ofthe citizenry, a subgroup that has long suffered prejudice by the majority. Second, bothamendments establish a national solution to a social problem over which there is no clearagreement. Rather than allow the states to deal with the issue separately as contemplated by theConstitution, the FMA imposes a uniform law on all states without any "concurrent" powersgranted to the states. In fact, the marriage amendment is more intrusive of state powers than the
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Eighteenth Amendment. Whereas the interstate commerce clause grants power to Congress toregulate sales and transportation of alcohol across state lines, there is no similar Congressionalpower over domestic relations. In fact, Senator Bailey's concern raised at the time of theEighteenth Amendment has been realized--the FMA is a national marriage law! Third, as to personal liberty, the FMA is far more intrusive than the Eighteenth Amendment.Citizens do not have a fundamental right to consume alcohol. [119] In fact, the liberty interest inconsuming alcohol is relatively insignificant. Yet the Eighteenth Amendment left personal useunaffected in order to protect personal liberty interests. The Court has held, however, thatcitizens do have a fundamental right to marry. [120] The FMA defines a class of unpopularindividuals and deprives them of the ability to marry another of the same sex. Although same-sexmarriage may not rise to a fundamental federal constitutional right, it certainly raises afundamental interest more important than the interest to consume alcohol. Finally, while support for the Eighteenth Amendment was largely fueled by hatred for andprejudice against German descendants, it did not target Germans or German descendantsspecifically. Likewise, the marriage amendment is likely to be largely fueled by prejudice againstgay Americans. [121] The FMA is far worse than the Eighteenth Amendment, however, becauseit specifically targets a discrete subgroup, expressly drafting prejudice in the Constitution. B. The Proposed Anti-Miscegenation Amendment There have been several proposed amendments that would have deprived individuals offundamental constitutional rights or interests; however, no other amendment so flagrantlyviolates all three basic tenets of our constitution as does the FMA. [122] The most direct parallelwith the marriage amendment was the proposed anti-miscegenation amendment. For many years,states outlawed marriage between individuals of different races through anti-miscegenationstatutes. [123] Nevertheless, early in the twentieth century, a renowned black boxer named JackJohnson garnered much publicity when he married a white woman, Lucille Cameron. [124] Thethought of "a brutal African prizefighter" marrying a white woman enraged CongressmanSeaborn Roddenberry of Georgia so much that he proposed a constitutional amendmentprohibiting interracial marriages. [125] Roddenberry believed that his amendment was necessaryto protect white women because "[n]o more voracious parasite ever sucked at the heart of puresociety, innocent girlhood, or Caucasian motherhood than the one which welcomes andrecognizes the sacred ties of wedlock between Africa and America." [126] White Americanslacked the enthusiasm to enact the amendment, and the amendment garnered little support amongthe black community. [127] The amendment proposed to ban interracial marriage was neverenacted into law. The parallels with the FMA are obvious. The FMA seeks to deprive same-sex couples frommarrying in the same manner that the anti-miscegenation amendment sought to depriveindividuals of different races from marrying. The support for both amendments is grounded inprejudice and infringes upon the states' power to define marriage, a state institution. [128] At the
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time the anti-miscegenation amendment failed, the Court had not yet held that interracial coupleshad a constitutional right to marry. Instead, the states were left to legislate independently. Severaldecades later, the Supreme Court in Loving v. Virginia held that interracial couples have aconstitutional right to marry. [129] Therefore, the FMA also must fail so that the states mayretain the freedom to legislate independently, and allow the U.S. Supreme Court to ultimatelyresolve the debate concerning the individual liberty interests of this minority group. C. The Proposed Anti-Divorce Amendment The Progressive era bore another social reform movement to change the divorce lawsthroughout the nation. [130] This movement shared many of the same characteristics of theprohibition movement. [131] In fact, just as the prohibition movement divided society in its time,the issue of divorce created two conflicting movements: one seeking to restrict divorce and oneseeking to make divorce more accessible. [132] The traditionalists saw divorce as "an attack onthe sacred nature of marriage" and believed that, by making the practice of divorce more difficult,they would be protecting the morality of people. [133] On the other hand, more liberal statesexpanded upon the grounds for divorce. [134] Due to variations among the states about theacceptable grounds for divorce, however, citizens of a more restrictive state would often migrateto a state with more open divorce laws. [135] The ability of citizens to escape the restrictivedivorce law states prompted the divorce reform movement which portrayed divorce as "a dangerto American civilization." [136] One notable reformer, Theodore Woolsey, the first chief officerof the New England Divorce Reform League and former president of Yale University, "comparedthe U.S. to Rome and warned that the nation would repeat the empire's fate if it continued toallow 'connubial unfaithfulness and divorce' to increase. Keeping 'family life pure and simple'was the key to preserving the nation's 'present political forms."' [137] The reformers introduced the first constitutional amendment in 1884 which resurfaced for thenext sixty years although it never passed. [138] Congress was worried about the consequences ofallowing the federal government to have authority over marriage relations. [139] Moreover, itwas particularly difficult to build a national consensus about what grounds would be proper forgranting divorce. The Supreme Court mostly stayed out of the issue of divorce except forallowing the states broad latitude in refusing to accept out-of-state divorces. [140] Although thisled to uncertainty, it also led to a proliferation of divorce-mill jurisdictions and, with thesejurisdictions available, the movement remained divided and never succeeded in making divorce anational issue. [141] The parallels with the FMA are apparent. Similar constituencies are claiming the need toprotect the institution of marriage and the nation from moral destruction by adopting a federalsolution to a state problem about which individuals disagree. The marriage amendment, however,is more egregious in that it targets only a small minority of citizens, unlike the divorceamendment that would have limited all citizens from seeking divorce. Ironically, if savingmarriage is the real concern, it seems much more threatening to the marital institution to allowcouples to exit easily than it is to allow more couples to enter. 
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Moreover, this issue of migratory marriage is likely to be more threatening to theconservative "moral majority," than were migratory divorces at the time of the anti-divorceamendment. This is because the recognition of same-sex couples, even if only by certain states,signals acceptance of homosexual conduct, a concept still repugnant to many people today. Forsixty years the Congress was unwilling to expand federal authority over marital relations bysetting a national standard for divorce. A principled consistency would inevitably dictate acongressional refusal to expand federal authority over marital relations when the object is todeprive individuals the ability to marry. D. The Proposed Corwin Amendment A third proposed amendment that violated principles of liberty and equality was the CorwinAmendment. [142] The amendment read: "No Amendment shall be made to the Constitutionwhich will authorize or give to Congress the power to abolish or interfere, within any State, withthe domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or service by the laws ofthat State." [143] Thankfully, we can look back with the knowledge that the amendment was notenacted (although the Civil War did follow), and today likely all would agree that such anamendment would be considered despicable. [144] However, at the time of the proposedamendment, such an argument was not so apparent. [145] First, slavery was consistent with the text of the Constitution as it was understood at itsadoption and throughout the 1800s. Jefferson himself, at the time of the founding, acknowledgedthat slavery was protected under the Constitution [146] and while sentiments had changed overtime, there still existed a strong commitment among several states to uphold the rights ofslaveholders. President Lincoln, who opposed slavery on moral grounds and opposed extendingit to new territories, "had never opposed its maintenance in those jurisdictions where it alreadyexisted." [147] In his First Inaugural Address, he commented on the then pending CorwinAmendment. He stated that he did not object to making explicit that the individual states possesscontrol over their domestic institutions, exclusive of federal interference, that he did not object tosuch a provision being made irrevocable, and that such a provision was probably unnecessaryinasmuch as it was already then "implied constitutional law." [148] Second, while the language of the amendment referenced state "domestic policy," slavery wasa business. Slave holders argued that slaves were rightfully their property. [149] It follows then,at least under today's interpretation, that because the property interests substantially affectinterstate commerce, it would be appropriate for the federal government to legislate in this areapursuant to Congress's Commerce Clause powers. [150] Third, although the amendment clearly violated individual rights, the individuals affectedwere not then considered citizens of the United States. [151] Fourth, the amendment did comportwith basic federalism principles. It did not require all states to conform to one standard, to adoptor reject slavery. Instead it protected the states from federal interference in their domestic affairs,allowing the states to decide how to treat slavery within their borders. Finally, the amendment
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was consistent with Court doctrine of the day, which upheld slavery, and thus was not an attemptto usurp judicial authority or violate separation of powers principles. [152] In contrast to the proposed marriage amendment, even the Corwin Amendment--a proposalthat we today recognize as deplorable--would have been less destructive of fundamentalconstitutional principles than the FMA. First, the Constitution is silent on the issue of marriagesand therefore it is a power left to the states (and the people), even though at the time of theconstitutional convention, same-sex marriages were not contemplated. By contrast, slavery wasgenerally accepted by the Framers and was, in fact, protected by the Constitution. [153] Second,the FMA legislates in an area uniquely left to the states, whereas the Corwin Amendmenttargeted domestic affairs involving property rights and thus could arguably fall within the federalcommerce power. [154] Third, the FMA specifically targets and deprives U.S. citizens of theirinterests in liberty and equality, unlike the Corwin Amendment that targeted non-citizens. [155]Fourth, the FMA violates federalism principles by binding all states to one national standard. TheCorwin Amendment, on the other hand, limited federal power to interfere with the states andallowed them to make their own decision regarding slavery. Finally, the marriage amendment isfueled by a desire to overturn state judicial precedent expanding individual rights to marry,whereas the Corwin Amendment was consistent with judicial precedent of its day. [156] Like our modern-day reaction to the Corwin Amendment, it is likely that years from now, ourdescendants will read about the marriage amendment and be equally surprised and saddened athow an enlightened society could consider drafting such prejudice into such a cherisheddocument, violating the three basic principles for which the Constitution stands. E. The Proposed Flag-Burning Amendment One other proposed amendment that continues to severely threaten individual rights is theflag-burning amendment, [157] designed to overrule two Supreme Court decisions, Texas v.Johnson [158] and United States v. Eichman. [159] In Johnson, the Court reversed the convictionof an individual prosecuted under the Texas flag-desecration statute as a violation of his firstamendment right to free speech. [160] In Eichman, the Court invalidated Congress's FlagProtection Act as an unconstitutional restraint on free speech. [161] The flag-burning amendmentwould grant to Congress the power to prohibit the physical desecration of the U.S. flag. [162]The Court has held that even if the desecration of the flag is offensive to a majority of citizens,[163] it is also a powerful tool of expression. [164] Moreover, free expression is a fundamentalprinciple embodied in the Bill of Rights and thus trumps the government's interest in enforcingthe moral beliefs of the majority. [165] Justice Kennedy commented that the Court must,occasionally, make a decision that it does not necessarily "like" in order to uphold the basicprinciples underlying the Constitution. [166] The flag-burning amendment has not yet been approved by both houses of Congress,although it has come very close and in fact was recently passed by the House of Representativesagain. [167] Scholars criticize the proposed amendment as clearly in conflict with the express
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language of the First Amendment. [168] Furthermore, critics contend that the flag-burningamendment is overly vague, invites unlimited prosecutorial discretion in its application, abridgesreligious liberty along with free speech, and, ironically, would be ineffective in stopping flagburning as a political protest. [169] Again, it is productive to compare the flag-burning amendment and the FMA. First, these twoamendments are similar in that they both seek to restrict freedoms that are consideredfundamental: the freedom of speech and the freedom to marry. Just like the flag-burningamendment infringes upon the right to speech, which lies as the bedrock of our democracy, [170]the FMA is inconsistent with principles of liberty and equality. It is debatable whether the FMAactually infringes individual rights to liberty and equality because the Supreme Court has not yetruled on whether same-sex couples have a right to marry. [171] However, the MassachusettsSupreme Judicial Court has already so decided. [172] Even though the flag-burning amendment and the FMA are similar in one respect, in manyothers the flag-burning amendment would actually be less destructive of individual libertyinterests than the FMA. First, the flag-burning amendment restricts speech in a limited manner.The Supreme Court has held that the right to free speech is not absolute; certain types of speechare not protected, such as obscenity, [173] defamation, [174] and fighting words. [175] While theflag-burning amendment would limit citizens' free speech, it would do so in a relatively discretefashion by targeting speech most citizens reject as unworthy of protection. [176] This is similarto other classes of unprotected speech. In contrast, the FMA completely deprives same-sexcouples of the ability to marry and thus is arguably more destructive of an individual interest thanthe flag-burning amendment. [177] Second, while the flag burning amendment only affectsindividuals wanting to criticize the government by burning the flag, it does not expressly target adiscrete and discernable class of individuals. In contrast, the FMA targets same-sex couples, gayAmericans, a class that has long suffered bias and prejudice from the majority. [178] Finally,state interests are not seriously infringed by the flag-burning amendment since it protects afederal interest. In contrast, the marriage amendment deprives states of the right to establishmarriage laws by establishing a national definition of marriage. III. Amendments and Separation of Powers: Amendments Overruling Supreme Court Decisions The FMA defies separation of powers principles. The Framers established three branches ofgovernment and provided for appropriate checks and balances such that no branch may assumecentralized power and threaten the delicate balance created. [179] The legislative branch isgranted the power to enact laws. [180] The President is granted the power to enforce those laws.[181] The judiciary is granted the power to adjudicate cases and controversies. [182] Thejudiciary is the primary protector of individual rights, and the sole protector of the rights of the"minority." [183] This branch is devoted to fairness, respect, and dignity for the individual andmakes decisions "based on normative and practical moral reasoning." [184] Since 1803, theSupreme Court has been deemed the final interpreter of the Constitution with the ability to
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review laws enacted by the legislature to ensure they are consistent with constitutional principles.[185] Because the judicial branch has the ultimate authority over constitutional interpretation andconstruction, the only "check" on judicial power of constitutional interpretation is theconstitutional amendment process. The amendment process should be used to overturn the Courtonly when it acts beyond its powers or inconsistently with constitutional principles. Otherwise,the careful balance of powers among the branches is compromised. The history of amending the Constitution to overrule Supreme Court decisions is consistentwith this view and is particularly relevant here. While the U.S. Supreme Court is not beingoverturned by the FMA, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's Goodridge decision is injeopardy. Goodridge was the catalyst for the fervor behind the proposed marriage amendment.Moreover, the FMA will forever prevent the U.S. Supreme Court from addressing the issue. Only four constitutional amendments have been adopted to overrule the Supreme Court.[186] They are: (1) the Eleventh Amendment, which overruled Chisolm v. Georgia; [187] (2) theThirteenth Amendment and, most specifically, the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment,[188] which overruled Dred Scott v. Sanford; [189] (3) the Sixteenth Amendment, whichoverruled Pollack v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co.; [190] and (4) the Twenty-Sixth Amendment,which overruled Oregon v. Mitchell. [191] As we will see, each amendment was in harmonywith the basic principles that underlie the Constitution--individual rights, separation of powers,and federalism. Moreover, in the cases where fundamental liberty interests were at stake, theamendment reestablished individual rights in light of the Court's limited interpretation of thoserights. Without analyzing the propriety of the individual Supreme Court decisions, the followingwill demonstrate that, unlike the FMA, the use of the amendment power to overrule these caseswas proper and consistent with basic democratic principles. First, in Chisolm, the Court was called upon to interpret the scope of its own jurisdictionalpower "extend[ing] . . . to Controversies between two or more States;" [192] specifically,whether such power authorized suits against a State by a private citizen of another State. [193]The Court held it had such power. [194] The anti-federalists were outraged by this decision,viewing it as a direct threat to state sovereignty. [195] Four years later the Senate introduced theEleventh Amendment to reverse the decision. [196] The Eleventh Amendment was a proper useof constitutional amendment procedures to reign in the Court. In Chisolm, the Court broadlyinterpreted its own authority pursuant to Article III in finding that federal courts had jurisdictionto adjudicate cases brought by individuals against a state. A decision by one branch to broadlyconstrue its own powers [197] is problematic and thus using the amendment process to reign inthe Court's authority is consistent with separation of powers principles. Moreover, the Court'sdecision directly threatened state sovereignty by allowing federal courts to entertain suits byindividuals against the state itself. Thus, the Eleventh Amendment's restraint of federal judicialpower over the states enforced federalism principles. 
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In contrast, the FMA is designed to overrule the Goodridge decision which expanded therights of individual citizens as against the state legislature; Goodridge did not expand directly thecourt's jurisdiction. Of course, by finding a statute unconstitutional the court is trumping thelegislatures' prerogative and thus arguably does threaten the delicate balance between thejudiciary and the legislature. However, as the protector of individual rights as against anoverreaching government, this is an appropriate function of the judiciary. The FMA not onlylimits the rights of individuals and replaces the court's judgment with that of the legislature,effectively expanding legislative authority and the delicate balance among the branches, itthreatens state sovereignty by setting a national standard in an area exclusively retained by thestates and is inconsistent with federalism principles. Second, in Dred Scott, the Court held that a federal court in Missouri had no jurisdiction tohear Scott's suit to win his freedom because Scott, as a slave, was not a citizen of the UnitedStates, as "citizen" was understood at the time the Constitution was ratified. [198] Chief JusticeTaney labored to explain that there was no way to read the Constitution to interpretAfrican-Americans as citizens, largely because many founders themselves were slave holders.[199] The Court tirelessly canvassed the history of blacks brought to this country as slaves andthe views of the "people" toward the slaves during colonial times, at the adoption of theConstitution, and during the expansion of the territories. Justice Taney concluded that slaveswere never intended to be included under the word "citizens" in the Constitution. [200] Heexplained that states or territories that outlawed slavery did so because slaves were ill-suited tothe local economies and not because the states or territories acknowledged a slave's personhood.[201] The Court, however, invited an amendment to the Constitution stating: It is not the province of the court to decide upon the justice or injustice, the policy orimpolicy, of these laws. The decision of that question belonged to the political or law-makingpower; to those who formed the sovereignty and framed the Constitution . . . . If any of itsprovisions are deemed unjust, there is a mode prescribed in the instrument itself by which itmay be amended; but while it remains unaltered, it must be construed now as it wasunderstood at the time of its adoption. [202] Justice Charles P. Curtis resigned from the Court, in part because he believed that the opinionhad significantly damaged the Court's stature. [203] Others described Taney's opinion as "anauthorized registration of the political heresies of the dominant party of the day" and suggestedthat the primary effect of Dred Scott would be the "loss of confidence in the sound judicialintegrity and strictly legal character" of the Court. [204] As a precedent, Dred Scott was remarkably short-lived. In June, 1862, Congress abolishedslavery in all the federal territories. Edward Bates, President Abraham Lincoln's AttorneyGeneral, issued an opinion late that year declaring that free men of color born in the UnitedStates were citizens of the United States. Three years later the Thirteenth and FourteenthAmendments were passed, obliterating the last vestiges of Dred Scott. 
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The Dred Scott decision, perhaps one of the most notoriously "bad" decisions in the Court'shistory, enshrined the denigration of an entire class of people, finding they were not citizens ofthis country but rather the property of slave holders. While historically this may have beenconsistent with the ideals of our ancestors, it clearly was a decision violating the fundamentalprinciples of human dignity, respect, liberty, and equality. The Thirteenth and FourteenthAmendments corrected this error by abolishing slavery and granting slaves citizenship.Interestingly, even the Court in Dred Scott recognized the Constitution was flawed in itsprotection of slavery but felt itself bound by the document. [205] However, the Court suggestedthat Congress amend the Constitution to correct for this problem. [206] Thus, the Thirteenth andFourteenth Amendments were not only consistent with principles of individual liberty andequality, they were consistent with the Justices' desires, if not their "official" decision, and thusdid not seriously threaten separation of powers principles. Of course, the Thirteenth Amendmentremoved the power of the states to allow slavery, and thus is inconsistent with the principle ofstates' rights. However, the need to establish national standards to protect individual libertyinterests and dignity far outweigh federalism concerns in this situation. [207] Third and similarly, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, which overruled Mitchell and extendedthe right to vote to all citizens eighteen years or older, expanded individual rights, and infringedslightly on the states' freedom to establish their own voting age standards. [208] In Mitchell, theJustice Department, several states, and other interested parties challenged the Voting Rights ActAmendments of 1970 [209] that, among other things, lowered the minimum age of voters in bothstate and federal elections from twenty-one to eighteen. [210] Many states refused to complywith the Act on the basis that it "takes away from them the powers reserved to the States by theConstitution to control their own elections." [211] The Court concluded that Congress could setthe age for voters for federal elections but could not dictate such requirements for state or localelections. [212] The Court found that the Framers intended for the states to set their own votingcriteria for local and state elections as a means of maintaining a federalist structure ofgovernment. [213] Because only three states passed laws to allow eighteen-year olds to vote instate and local elections, Mitchell created dual voting age requirements in most all states. [214]The Twenty-Sixth Amendment granting the right to all citizens eighteen years of age and older tovote in all elections was proposed to remedy the anticipated confusion, fraud, and costlyadministration of such a dual system. [215] Whenever a federal constitutional amendment is designed to expand individual rights ofliberty and equal treatment under the law, thereby setting a new federal floor for individualrights, the power of the state is confined. For this reason, the Court in Dred Scott and Mitchell, toprotect its legitimacy, refused to interpret individual rights expansively against the states with theexpectation that Congress, the states, or the people would act to "correct" its decisions andexpand individual rights through a more democratic process--constitutional amendment. It isappropriate and consistent with democratic principles to set a new federal floor for individualrights by a constitutional amendment overruling a Court decision in which the Court feltrestrained to expand those rights. 
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By contrast, the FMA has the opposite effect. It sets a new federal ceiling for individualrights nationwide in response to one state court expanding individual liberties. TheMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court chose to interpret individual liberty interests moreexpansively than the U.S. Supreme Court in Dred Scott or Mitchell, leaving itself open tocriticism of being "activist." [216] As a state court, interpreting the state constitution, andaffecting only its citizens, it is understandable why the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Courtwould interpret individual rights more expansively than the U.S. Supreme Court, as its decisionaffects only Massachusetts citizens. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Goodridge acted well within its own authorityas the final arbiter of its state constitution issuing a very thoughtful, well-supported, rationaldecision, following the law, setting a policy founded on equality, and protecting the interest ofthe minority. [217] The court held that the Massachusetts legislature has no legitimate interest indenying two committed individuals a marriage license solely because they are of the same sex.[218] In fact, the court found that such denial places same-sex families in jeopardy by deprivingthe couples and their children important protections afforded opposite-sex couples. [219] As theonly institution devoted to protecting minority interests, its ruling protecting those interests doesnot deserve to be overruled by constitutional amendment. The FMA is an inappropriate use of the amendment power designed to prevent any otherstate court and the U.S. Supreme Court from addressing this issue. Congress is limitingindividual interests through a constitutional amendment and substituting its judgment for thecourts' judgment. One could argue that the FMA does no more than codify the current state of thelaw and thus does not affect liberty interests at all. Because the Court has not held that a federalright to same-sex marriage exists (at least not yet), it is less of an affront on individual libertythan if the amendment removed a right that the Court has already found to exist. Nevertheless,general notions of liberty are broader than those found as rights in the Constitution; and the moresignificant the interest at stake, the more suspect is an amendment denying that interest. Furthermore, while it is true that, historically, marriage has been the union of a man andwoman, marriage has changed in many respects over time to accommodate evolving notions ofliberty and equality. [220] This evolution generally takes place in the courts as individuals asserttheir interests under the Fourteenth Amendment. [221] By freezing the current state of the lawthrough a constitutional amendment, such evolution is impossible. Thus, the FMA redistributesthe powers of the three branches by denying the courts (as well as the states) the ability to decidethis issue. Through amendment, the legislative branch has the power to enact laws that establish societalstandards only so long as the laws enacted do not violate the constitutional rights of individuals.[222] The legislature is not empowered to draft laws to enshrine illegitimate prejudices of themajority. Allowing the legislature, with the endorsement of the executive, to amend theConstitution to expressly overrule a decision of the judiciary, which acted consistently withdemocratic principles by protecting the rights of a minority of the people, destroys the delicate
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balance of power among the branches. Finally, in Pollock, [223] the Court struck down an income tax amendment to the WilsonTariff Act adopted by Congress in 1894. [224] Designed to help solve the severe economictroubles of the late nineteenth century, those who had opposed the income tax believed it to besocialistic and hostile to free enterprise. [225] The Court held the income tax was notapportioned and thus unconstitutional in violation of art. I, sec. 9, cl. 4 of the Constitution, whichlimits Congress's power to impose a tax "unless in proportion to the Census or Enumerationherein before directed to be taken." [226] The Court stated that whether the income tax wasdesirable or not was a question for the political branches and suggested that the political branchesamend the Constitution to allow for such a tax if politically desirable. [227] In the early twentiethcentury, Congress followed the Court's suggestion and in 1913 the Sixteenth Amendment wasenacted, stating: "The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes on income, fromwhatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard toany census or enumeration." [228] Unlike the income tax, same-sex marriage is not a political question better left to themajoritarian branches. Rather, it presents a question of discrimination against a targeted minority,the type of question expressly suited to the courts. The court in Goodridge, as the sole protectorof minority rights, protected the minority. The FMA is an illegitimate use of the constitutionalamendment process to overrule a court decision and threatens separation of powers principles. IV. Amendments and Federalism Federalism principles define the allocation of power between the federal and stategovernments. The federal government is one of "limited" powers; the articles of the Constitutionenumerate those powers. [229] While certain powers lie within the exclusive domain of thefederal government, most of the enumerated powers are shared with the states. [230] The TenthAmendment reserves all powers not expressly delegated to the federal government to the states orto the people. [231] Federalism principles serve a very important function by allowing the experimentation ofdeveloping ideals at the state level without affecting the entire union. [232] In this manner, "new"ideals are tested before they are adopted nationwide or refuted, and individuals have the choice tolive in a state that protects the liberty interests important to them. [233] The states, of course,may not reduce individual liberties below the floor established by the federal government, [234]but they are free to expand upon them. [235] In fact, once there is sufficient "experimentation"within the states, the federal government may step in and provide all citizens of the United Statesthe liberties granted by the "experimenting" states by establishing a new federal floor forindividual rights. [236] An amendment that infringes on fundamental state powers is highly destructive of statesovereignty and inconsistent with federalism principles. Domestic relations are traditionally anexclusive state power. [237] The authority to define "marriage" falls exclusively with the states
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as perhaps the most central aspect of domestic relations. [238] The Constitution grants no powerto the federal government to define marriage or grant marriage licenses to the people. State civilmarriage is exactly that, a state (not federal) civil (not religious) institution. All couples aremarried pursuant to state authority, and the federal government merely agrees to acknowledgethose marriages for federal purposes. [239] Moreover, while there are separate institutions forreligious marriage, civil institutions are not dependent upon, nor should they be influenced by,religious tenets. [240] The FMA would force all states to define marriage as the union of a man and a woman;depriving any state of the ability to deviate from that definition independent of the state's interestor policy. This power is outside the scope of any existing power granted to the federalgovernment. Because the FMA is designed to limit rather than protect individual liberties, the useof federal power here is illegitimate and infringes upon a fundamental power of the states.Moreover, by trumping state authority in this way, the benefit of having states experiment withnew laws is nullified. [241] A. State Experimentation States have experimented with the definition of marriage over the years, demonstrating theusefulness of such experimentation. The most obvious parallel to the same-sex marriage debate isthe history of anti-miscegenation statutes in this country. Long ago citizens began challengingstate anti-miscegenation laws, which outlawed the marriage between individuals of differentraces. [242] In 1852, Maine became one of the first states to uphold the constitutionality of ananti-miscegenation statute and declare interracial marriages null and void. [243] It was not until1948 that California became the first state to declare its anti-miscegenation statuteunconstitutional. [244] During the next twenty years, cases were brought in other stateschallenging similar anti-miscegenation statutes and several successfully invalidated them. [245]However, it was not until 1967, when the U.S. Supreme Court held in Loving v. Virginia that nostate could deny two people a marriage license merely because they were of different races. TheCourt held that this denial violated federal constitutional principles of liberty and equality. [246]Loving thus set a new federal floor for individual rights throughout the nation. Interestingly,these events never would have transpired had the proposed anti-miscegenation amendment beenratified. [247] A similar history with regard to same-sex marriage is developing in our lifetime. The veryfirst challenge to state marriage laws that deprived same-sex couples of a right to marry wasbrought in Minnesota. [248] In 1971, the Minnesota Supreme Court dismissed the challenge andthe U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the appeal. [249] For many years, same-sex coupleschallenged similar statutes in other states and lost. [250] However, in 1993, the Supreme Court of Hawaii held that denying same-sex couples a rightto marry amounted to sex-based discrimination and violated the Equal Rights Amendment of theHawaii Constitution unless the state could justify the discriminatory treatment. [251] On remand,
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the Hawaii trial judge found that the state failed to justify the discriminatory treatment and heldthe state statute violated the equal rights of same-sex partners. [252] The case was appealed tothe Supreme Court of Hawaii for a second time [253] and, while on appeal, the state legislaturepassed two laws: (1) a Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act--granting couples ineligible to marry, certainbasic benefits, [254] and (2) a proposed constitutional amendment stating that the Hawaiilegislature shall have the power to reserve marriage for opposite-sex couples. [255] In 1998, thecitizens of Hawaii approved the state constitutional amendment. [256] Meanwhile, same-sex couples in the state of Vermont were challenging the Vermontmarriage laws, which denied same-sex couples marriage licenses. The challengers argued that theVermont marriage laws violated the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution.[257] In 1999, the Vermont Supreme Court agreed and held that same-sex couples in Vermontare entitled to the same benefits and protections afforded by Vermont law to marriedopposite-sex partners. [258] The Court did not find that the denial of a marriage license violatedthe constitution but rather the denial of the benefits associated with a marriage license did. [259]The court instructed the Vermont legislature to craft an appropriate means for granting the samemarital benefits to same-sex couples as enjoyed by opposite-sex couples. [260] In April 2000, theVermont Legislature created civil unions for such couples. [261] The Goodridge decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Court in November, 2003 is the mostrecent attempt by a state appellate court to expand the rights of same-sex couples. [262] Thatcourt held that same-sex couples have a right to marry (not just a right to benefits), and that anyseparate but equal solution would be unconstitutional under the Massachusetts Constitution.[263] In other words, the court held that a civil union recognizing same-sex couples and grantingidentical benefits is not constitutionally adequate in Massachusetts. [264] The court directed theMassachusetts legislature to begin issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples on May 17,2004. [265] The Governor of Massachusetts requested a stay from the Court while the legislatureattempted to pass an amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution, but the request was notgranted. [266] The first same-sex couples were married in Massachusetts on May 17, 2004. [267]When the federal government attempts to step in and cut-off the debate among the states, bysetting a federal ceiling on individual rights nationwide, it destroys a central purpose of our dualstate and federal system and, worse, enshrines inequality and prejudice into our Constitution.[268] B. Protecting States from Activist Sister States The federal government has an interest in protecting the states from each other. In otherwords, each state is a separate sovereign, and no state can infringe the sovereignty of the otherstates. [269] The proponents of the marriage amendment claim there is a legitimate need toamend the federal constitution to protect states from the "activist" judges of other states, likethose in Massachusetts. They also argue that to allow individual states to issue marriage licensesto same-sex couples will place all other states in the position of having to recognize thosemarriages and to grant benefits to the couples in violation of their public policy. [270] 
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This claim is misleading and unrealistic. The Goodridge decision and the marriage licensesgranted in Massachusetts affect no other state nor the federal government directly. [271] Albeitindirectly, each state's laws affect every other state and the federal government. The Full Faith and Credit ("FF&C") Clause of the Constitution defines the credit that eachstate must grant to other states' legal acts and protects the states from overreaching sister states.[272] The FF&C Clause was drafted to reconcile the desire for diversity among the states withmutual respect for differences of opinion. [273] While the clause states that each state must giveFF&C to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of the other states, [274] it is notabsolute. The Supreme Court recognizes various exceptions to the generalized requirement ofmutual respect, most notably when recognizing a judgment by a sister state that the home statefinds fundamentally objectionable. [275] In fact, it was common during the period when theanti-miscegenation statutes were being challenged for states not to recognize interracialmarriages granted in other states on the basis that those marriages were odious, against the will ofGod and public policy, and an attempt by citizens to avoid their home state's restrictive marriagelaws. [276] Thus, there is precedent to support the idea that states need not recognize same-sexmarriages granted in sister states if they are deemed contrary to that state's public policy. [277] Moreover, the federal legislature has already acted to protect states from sister states thathave decided to permit same-sex marriages. In 1996, after the Hawaii Supreme Court decision onsame-sex marriage was announced, the federal government enacted the Defense of Marriage Act("DOMA") granting the states the power to refuse recognize a same-sex marriage entered into inanother state. [278] Many states followed suit and enacted their own statutes refusing torecognize same-sex marriages. [279] These state statutes are designed to support states' claims,under the FF&C Clause, that recognition of same-sex marriages would violate a fundamentalstate policy interest. There are strong arguments that the federal DOMA statute is unconstitutional. [280] Theprimary argument for challenging DOMA is that the Act "is the antithesis of a full faith andcredit measure which lacks sufficient generality and, without adequate justification, encroachesupon an area traditionally reserved for state regulation." [281] In mid-July 2004, the first suitchallenging a state's power to refuse recognition of a valid Massachusetts same-sex marriage wasfiled in Florida. [282] The plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment that Florida's and the federalgovernment's refusal to recognize their Massachusetts marriage license violated theirfundamental rights of equal protection and due process, the FF&C Clause, the Privileges andImmunities Clauses, and the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. [283] Although thecourt granted defendants' motion to dismiss, proponents of the FMA use the possible success ofsuch suits to strengthen their contention that the marriage amendment is necessary. If DOMA isstruck down as unconstitutional, it is incapable of protecting states from the acts of sister states.However, even if DOMA were held unconstitutional, the FF&C clause arguably allows states todecline to recognize marriages that are against their states' public policy, providing sufficientprotection to state sovereignty. [284] 
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C. Protecting the Federal Government from Activist States Although the federal government has no direct power over the marital institution, the federalgovernment recognizes state marriages and grants many federal benefits to spouses as defined bystate law. [285] Thus, the federal government does have an interest in the definition ofstate-sanctioned marriages. DOMA was enacted to protect this federal interest by denying federalrecognition to same-sex marriages recognized in any state. [286] DOMA is arguablyunconstitutional as "the Act unreasonably restricts interstate travel and is motivated by a desire toimpose an undeserved burden on a disfavored group." [287] If found unconstitutional by theSupreme Court, a constitutional amendment is likely the only mechanism to overrule the Court'sfinding. The House, fearful of this possibility, voted to approve "The Marriage Protection Act of2004," [288] which would strip federal courts of jurisdiction to hear challenges to DOMA andintroduced the Congressional Accountability for Judicial Activism Act of 2004, [289] to allowCongress, if two thirds of each House agree, to reverse the judgments of the U.S. Supreme Courtconcerning the constitutionality of an Act of Congress. Opponents claim both statutes areunconstitutional as a direct violation to the jurisdictional authority granted the federal courts bythe Constitution and in opposition to the centuries old Supreme Court case of Marbury v.Madison [290] and Ex parte McCardle. [291] In sum, amending the federal constitution to set a ceiling on individual liberty and equalityinterests and to dictate to every state of the union that a marriage must be defined as between aman and a woman infringes upon a power exclusively retained by the states. Moreover, itprevents the states from serving their unique function of experimentation, and defies the principleof federalism. The very same conservatives who rally for states' rights [292] when it suits theirpolitical agenda now demand that all states treat gay citizens unfairly and inequitably. Moreover,every attempt by Congress to achieve the same result short of a constitutional amendment is itselfarguably unconstitutional. Conclusion The U.S. Constitution is an amazing and versatile document and has served this country wellfor over 200 years. The Constitution has been amended since its adoption, but successfulamendments have been consistent with the spirit of the Constitution and the Framers' purposes.The FMA is not: the FMA is in direct conflict with fundamental principles for which ourdemocracy stands: individual rights, separation of powers, and federalism. Moreover, the FMAwill not protect the marital institution, instead it will enshrine bigotry and inequality in theConstitution. 
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END NOTES[*] Copyright 2005, Joan Schaffner. Associate Professor of Law, George Washington UniversityLaw School. Special thanks to Laurie Rubin, Heather Schwartz, and Ryan Smith for their superbresearch and helpful comments in the drafting of this Article. This Article is dedicated to fiveloving, adorable creatures--Freedom, Justice, Liberty, Equality, and Spirit--who provided theinspiration for this Article. George Washington University Law School, 2000 H Street, N.W.,Washington D.C., 20052; jschaf@law.gwu.edu; 202-994-7040. [1] Remarks Calling for a Constitutional Amendment Defining and Protecting Marriage, 40Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 276, 277 (Feb. 24, 2004) [hereinafter Remarks] [2] Id. [3] Id.; see The President's Radio Address, 40 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1253, 1254 (July 10,2004) (The union of a man and woman in marriage is the most enduring and important humaninstitution, and the law can teach respect or disrespect for that institution.... If courts create theirown arbitrary definition of marriage as a mere legal contract and cut marriage off from itscultural, religious, and natural roots, then the meaning of marriage is lost and the institution isweakened. ); The Courts, The Legislature, and the Executive: Separate and Equal? Questionsfrom the Audience, 87 Judicature 208, 218 (2004) [hereinafter Questions] ("Politicians use theword 'activist' when they're upset with judges."). [4] See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003) (holding that theMassachusetts state constitution forbids the denial of full legal marriage rights to same-sexcouples). [5] H.R.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003) (proposing an amendment to the United StatesConstitution that would define marriage as "the union of a man and a woman" and wouldprohibit any federal or state law from requiring "that marital status or the legal incidents thereofbe conferred upon unmarried couples or groups"). [6] In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 572 (Mass. 2004). [7] See Remarks, supra note 1, at 277. [8] 150 Cong. Rec. H7898, H7934 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 2004). [9] Id. at H7933-34. [10] 150 Cong. Rec. S8090-91 (daily ed. July 14, 2004) (defeating the motion with sixRepublicans and all but three Democrats); Press Release, National Gay and Lesbian Task Force,Justifications, Obfuscations and Wave of State Anti-Marriage Constitutional Amendments Cloud
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Defeat of Federal Marriage Amendment (July 15, 2004), athttp://www.thetaskforce.org/media/release.cfm? releaseID=710 (on file with the AmericanUniversity Law Review). [11] H.R.J. Res. 39, 109th Cong. (2005). [12] See Anne E. Kornblut, GOP to Press for Gay-Marriage Ban: Democrats Facing ReelectionPressure, Boston Globe, Nov. 14, 2004, at A25; Kate Zernike, Groups Vow Not to Let LossesDash Gay Rights, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 2004, § 1, at 30; Gary M. Segura, A Symposium on thePolitics of Same-Sex Marriage--An Introduction and Commentary, 38 PS: Pol. Sci. & Politics189, 189 (2005) ( "[T]he emergence of the analytically vague phrase 'moral values' from the exitpolls and some arm-chair analysis by the pundits had already raised to the level of conventionalwisdom the assertion that Senator John Kerry had lost because of the issue of same-sexmarriage."), available at http:// www.apsanet.org/imgtest/CJFX002-Segura[001-004]pdf. [13] See Statement by Matt Foreman, Executive Director of the National Gay and Lesbian TaskForce, Press Release, National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Justifications, Obfuscations andWave of State Anti-Marriage Constitutional Amendments Cloud Defeat of Federal MarriageAmendment (July 15, 2004), at http://www.thetaskforce.org/media/release.cfm?releaseID=710(on file with the American University Law Review) (noting that the vote defeating theamendment "was far from a ringing endorsement for equal rights for lesbian, gay, bisexual andtransgender (LGBT) people....[O]ver one dozen states...will have State Constitutionalamendments on the ballot this November [2004]"); Unitarian Universalist Association, StatesFacing Constitutional Amendments Banning Same-Sex Marriage, athttp://www.uua.org/news/2004/freedomtomarry/state_ballot_ initiatives.html (last visited July 9,2005) (on file with the American University Law Review) (listing states with constitutionalamendments on the 2004 ballot, including Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan,Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Utah). [14] See Stefen Styrsky, Changes at Top of Human Rights Campaign: Winnie StachelbergMoves to Educational Foundation; David Smith Quietly Returns, Gay City News (Feb. 10,2005), at http://www.gaycitynews.com/gcn_ 359/changesatthetop.html (on file with theAmerican University Law Review); John M. Broder, Groups Debate Slower Strategy on GayRights, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 2004, at A1; Joe Crea, HRC Restructures: Rosen Denies Jacques'Departure Related to November Election, N.Y. Blade Online (Dec. 10, 2004), at http://www.newyorkblade.com/2004/12-10/news/national/hrc.cfm (on file with the AmericanUniversity Law Review). [15] U.S. Const. amend. XV. [16] See Sanford Levinson, How Many Times Has the United States Constitution BeenAmended?: Accounting for Constitutional Change, in Responding to Imperfection: the Theoryand Practice of Constitutional Amendment 3 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) [hereinafter
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Responding to Imperfection] (discussing the importance of a living, evolving Constitution). [17] See infra Part II. [18] Throughout this Article the term "right" will be reserved for those individual interests thatthe Supreme Court has recognized as a constitutional right. The term liberty encompasses manyinterests, not all of which the Court has or likely will interpret as covered expressly by theConstitution. However, when evaluating the propriety of a constitutional amendment, anamendment that limits an important, even if not fundamental, liberty interest should beconsidered suspect. Of course an amendment that infringed upon a liberty interest found to befundamental, for example an amendment banning abortion nationwide, would be highly suspect. [19] U.S. Const. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933) (prohibiting the movement and exchange ofliquor within the United States). [20] U.S. Const. amend. XXI (repealing the Eighteenth Amendment). [21] See infra Part III. [22] See infra Part V (detailing how the Federal Marriage Amendment would undermine theability of the states to administer their own affairs). [23] See infra Part II.A. [24] See infra Part IV (discussing the Eleventh Amendment, which limited the federal judiciary'sauthority over suits brought by citizens against a state; the Thirteenth and the FourteenthAmendments, which abolished slavery and granted citizenship to slaves; the SixteenthAmendment, which permitted the federal government to collect income taxes; and theTwenty-Sixth Amendment, which extended voting rights to all citizens eighteen years or older). [25] See infra note 206 and accompanying text (noting Justice Taney's suggestion in Dred Scottv. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 405-06 (1856), that former slaves could only gain citizenship through aconstitutional amendment because the Court could not in good faith read a provision into theConstitution that the legislature never intended it to include). [26] See infra Part IV. [27] See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) (citing Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190(1888), for the proposition that the states retain the primary authority to regulate marriage). [28] See id. at 7 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316U.S. 535 (1942), for the proposition that state regulation of marriage must comport with theFourteenth Amendment). 
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[29] See infra Part V. [30] See infra Part V. [31] The FMA also appears to conflict with more constitutional principles than did otherproposed amendments. See infra note 122 (listing briefly categories of proposed amendments,especially those related to marriage). See generally M.A. Musmanno, Proposed Amendments tothe Constitution, H.R. Doc. No. 551 (2d Sess. 1929) (listing amendments proposed to Congresssince 1889); Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America, S. Doc.No. 163 (2d Sess. 1963) (listing all amendments submitted to Congress from 1926-1963). [32] See U.S. Const. art. V. [33] See Stephen M. Griffin, Constitutionalism in the United States: From Theory to Politics, inResponding To Imperfection, supra note 16, at 37, 49-50 ("Although more than ten thousandamendments have been proposed, only seventeen were adopted.... Only the SeventeenthAmendment, providing for the direct election of senators, changed a key element of the framer'sdesign."); John R. Vile, Encyclopedia of Constitutional Amendments, Proposed Amendments,and Amending Issues, 1789-1995, 48, 251 (1996) (detailing that six amendments have beensubmitted to the states but have not been ratified, with the most recent addressing child labor,submitted in June 1924 to the states for ratification. Interestingly, "the amendments that havebeen adopted are concentrated in just a few periods in our history. The first ten amendments wereratified in 1791; two more were added in 1798 and 1804, respectively.... After that, however--except for the three Civil War Amendments, which obviously arose from extraordinarycircumstances--no amendments were adopted for almost 110 years. Then, beginning in 1913, theConstitution was amended four times in seven years." David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance ofConstitutional Amendments, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1457, 1489-90 (2001). [34] Griffin, supra note 33, at 39 (describing the uniquely American preference thatconstitutional amendments be written and approved by the people). [35] The Federalist No. 10, at 60 (James Madison) (New York, J. & A. McLean, 1788). [36] See William L. Marbury, The Limitations Upon the Amending Power, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 223,232 (1919) ("'The government proceeds directly from the people...."') (quoting McCulloch v.Maryland, 4 U.S. 316, 402 (1819)); Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 1-2, at 2(2d ed. 1988) ("That all lawful power derives from the people and must be held in check topreserve their freedom is the oldest and most central tenet of American Constitutionalism."). [37] See, e.g., Marbury, supra note 36; Charles A. Kelbley, Are There Limits to ConstitutionalChange? Rawls on Comprehensive Doctrines, Unconstitutional Amendments, and the Basis ofEquality, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 1487 (2004); John R. Vile, The Case Against Implicit Limits onthe Constitutional Amending Process, in Responding to Imperfection, supra note 16, at 191, 198. 
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[38] See generally Kelbley, supra note 37 (outlining the arguments for implicit limitations to theamendment process including: (1) the definition of "amend" as limited to correction, notrevolution; (2) justifications based on the text, natural law, and normative arguments; and (3) theneed to interpret the Constitution holistically). [39] Marbury, supra note 36, at 225. [40] Thomas M. Cooley, The Power to Amend the Federal Constitution, 2 Mich. L.J. 109, 118(1893). [41] Id. [42] Vile, supra note 37, at 197 (citing Walter F. Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values,53 S. Cal. L. Rev. 703, 755-56 (1980), which quotes the Federal Constitutional Court inGermany). [43] See U.S. Const. pmbl. ("We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfectunion, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promotethe general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordainand establish this Constitution for the United States of America."). [44] See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457-60 (1991) (discussing how both the creation ofseparate and independent branches of the government and a federalist system that balances thepower between the federal and state governments reduces the risk of tyrrany and protects therights of the individual); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 25 (1926) (explaining the divisionof power among the three branches as a means to devise a more secure government); Tribe, supranote 36, § 1-2, at 2-3 (relating the conceptual understanding of the Founding Fathers thatcentralized power would lead to tyranny, whereas divided power would lead to liberty). [45] Vile, supra note 37, at 197 (citing Walter Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53S. Cal. L. Rev. 703, 755-57 (1980)). [46] See, e.g., John R. Vile, The Constitutional Amending Process in American PoliticalThought 173 (1992) (arguing that Article V was well-designed to ensure that constitutionalamendments truly reflect the will of the people); Walter Fairleigh Dodd, The Revision andAmendment of State Constitutions 236 (1910); Rhode Island v. Palmer, 253 U.S. 350 (1920).Article V specifically describes two substantive limits: one expired in 1808 and thus is no longerapplicable; the second required that each state have the same number of representatives in theSenate. These two enumerated substantive limits suggest that no other substantive limits wereintended. Kelbley, supra note 37, at 1535. [47] See Vile, supra note 37, at 198. 
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[48] U.S. Const. art. II, § 3, art. III, § 1. [49] See Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar ofPolitics 16 (2d ed. 1986); see also Questions, supra note 3, at 217. Of course, in creating thejudiciary, the Founders recognized that an interest of the "majority" was to provide a branch that,in fact, would protect minority interests. Thus, the role the courts play are in the interests of the"majority." Bickel, supra, at 16. [50] See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803) ("[A] law repugnant to the constitution isvoid; and... courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.") (emphasis inoriginal). While this power is quite broad--as "interpretation" itself involves defining what iscontained--principles of "interpretation" do impose limits on delineating that power from thepower to, in effect, "create" the Constitution. Nevertheless, as one noted commentator said manyyears ago, "the choice then presented to the American people [between allowing judicial reviewof constitutional amendments or not] may be one between an imperfect Constitution and noConstitution at all." Marbury, supra note 36, at 234. [51] See Mark E. Brandon, The "Original" Thirteenth Amendment and the Limits to FormalConstitutional Change, in Responding to Imperfection, supra note 16, at 215, 235. [52] U.S. Const. pmbl. [53] Marbury, supra note 36, at 228. [54] Cooley, supra note 40, at 118. [55] Marbury, supra note 36, at 229. [56] U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV (stating that an individual shall not be "deprived of life, liberty,or property without due process of law"). [57] Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that marriage is a fundamentalcivil right of every person); see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (extending thefundamental right of marriage to interracial marriage). [58] The question has been analyzed by scholars for several years and is beyond the scope of thisArticle. E.g., Andrew Sullivan, Same-Sex Marriage: Pro and Con (1997); Mark Strasser, LegallyWed: Same-Sex Marriage and the Constitution (1997); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Case forSame-Sex Marriage: From Sexual Liberty to Civilized Commitment (1996); Same-Sex Marriage:The Moral and Legal Debate (Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1997). In 2003 theSupreme Court held that criminalizing sodomy is unconstitutional. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.558 (2003). Justice Scalia, in dissent, argued that the majority decision would inevitably lead to afinding that same-sex couples have a constitutional right to marry. Id. at 604-05 (Scalia, J.,
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dissenting). This argument is debatable, but at the very least Lawrence offers support for a rightfor same-sex couples to marry. Had the Court instead upheld Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186(1986), the argument for a right for same-sex couples to marry would have been all butdestroyed. [59] Note that the Court has held that two consenting adults have a liberty right to engage insodomy in private. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. [60] See, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1103 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (finding aconstitutional violation of a prospective employee's rights to free speech and association when agovernment employer withdrew a job offer after learning the employee planned a weddingceremony to marry her same-sex partner). [61] See infra notes 234-236. [62] Griffin, supra note 33, at 39 (quoting Charles Howard McIlwain, Constitutionalism Ancientand Modern 24 (1940)). [63] See Jeff Rosen, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitutional?, 100 Yale L.J. 1073,1084-85 (1991). [64] Cf. U.S. Const. amend. XVII (providing the process by which Senators--who would vote topass constitutional amendments--are elected by the people of the respective states asrepresentatives of the people rather than of the legislatures). [65] See Jay S. Bybee, Ulysses at the Mast: Democracy, Federalism, and the Sirens' Song of theSeventeenth Amendment, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 500, 516-18 (1997). [66] U.S. Const. art. I, § 3. [67] U.S. Const. amend. XVII. [68] See Bybee, supra note 65, at 511 (discussing the prevailing philosophies at theConstitutional Convention for allowing state legislatures to elect senators: (1)Elbridge Gerrysuggested that the legislatures would elect upper class representatives like themselves, whichwould benefit the mercantile and commercial classes, and (2) George Mason urged that statesneeded to guard against the increasingly powerful federal government). [69] The Federalist No. 45, at 252 (James Madison) (J.R. Pole, ed., 2004) (The senate will beelected absolutely and exclusively by the state legislatures. Even the house of representatives,though drawn immediately from the people, will be chosen very much under the influence of thatclass of men, whose influence over the people obtains for themselves an election into the statelegislatures. Thus, each of the principal branches of the federal government will owe its existence
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more or less to the favor of the state governments, and must consequently feel a dependence,which is much more likely to beget a disposition too obsequious than too overbearing towardsthem.). [70] See Bybee, supra note 65, at 517 (explaining the delegates' defensive theory that states couldfrustrate Congress, if the need arose, by refusing to pay or to send their senators). [71] See id. at 545 (recounting the populist argument that senators needed to have a keener senseof responsibility to their constituents); Ralph A. Rossum, The Irony of ConstitutionalDemocracy: Federalism, the Supreme Court, and the Seventeenth Amendment, 36 San Diego L.Rev. 671, 708 (1999) (stating that people associated election by legislature with corruption andstalemate, while popular election inspired notions of democracy and progress). [72] See Bybee, supra note 65, at 545 (noting that the progressives and populists consideredelection by legislature anachronistic, as the state legislatures experienced turnover three timesduring a senator's six-year term). [73] See Rossum, supra note 71, at 711-12 (adding that discussion over ratification of theSeventeenth Amendment also focused on eliminating political corruption and freeing states fromthe burden of election). [74] See Eason v. State, 11 Ark. 481, 1851 WL 463, at *5 (1851). [75] See id. at *6 (explaining that the Bill of Rights protected citizens from all governmentencroachment into the enumerated rights). [76] Id. [77] See Cooley, supra note 40, at 112 (suggesting that the Bill of Rights prevented thegovernment from being able to seriously oppress an individual). [78] Eason, 1851 WL 463 at *7. [79] Elai Katz, On Amending Constitutions: The Legality and Legitimacy of ConstitutionalEntrenchment, 29 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 251, 287-88 (1996) (citations omitted). [80] Id. at 281 (quoting Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), 4 TheCollected Works of Abraham Lincoln 262, 270 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953)). President Lincoln wascommenting on the proposed Corwin Amendment. See infra Part II.D. Also, nineteen resolutionswere introduced in Congress between 1917 and 1928 to amend the Constitution requiring apopular ratification of all proposed amendments. See Musmanno, supra note 31, at 199- 204.Most recently, during consideration of the flag-burning amendment, critics recognized that onlythe people retained the power to adopt a constitutional amendment that violated fundamental
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constitutional norms, arguing that the amendment would have to be approved and ratified byconvention, not by Congress or the state legislatures. Eric Isaacson, The Flag Burning Issue: ALegal Analysis and Comment, 23 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 535, 599 (1990). [81] See Isaacson, supra note 80, at 589 (detailing that Article V allows for the followingprocedures for amending the Constitution: (1) approval by two-thirds of each house of Congressand ratification by three-fourths of the state legislatures; (2)approval by two-thirds of each houseand ratification by constitutional conventions in three-fourths of the states; (3) approval by anational constitutional convention and ratification by three-fourths of the state legislatures; and(4) approval by a national constitutional convention and ratification by constitutional conventionsin three-fourths of the states). [82] See United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 732 (1931) (relying on the Framers' silenceregarding limitations on ratification procedures as authority for continuing to allow Congress toexercise discretion in choosing how to ratify an amendment). [83] Id. at 730. [84] Id. at 733. [85] See David Castro, A Constitutional Convention: Scouting Article V's UndiscoveredCountry, 134 U. Penn. L. Rev. 939, 945 (1986) (accepting John Ely's theory of virtualdemocracy). [86] Id. [87] Id. at 965. [88] See id. ("[I]t could be argued that an amendment repealing the Fifteenth Amendment wasinvalid on the grounds that the legislators had purposely discriminated against the interests oftheir minority constituents in ratifying the amendment."). [89] See Rosen, supra note 63, at 1084-85. [90] See Griffin, supra note 33, at 39. [91] The Eighteenth Amendment was repealed by the Twenty-First Amendment less than fifteenyears after its enactment. U.S. Const. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. Const. amend. XXI. [92] See Alan Bjerga, Sides Clash Over Same-Sex Marriage Ban, Wichita Eagle, Dec. 29, 2003,at 1A (reporting that critics argue that the FMA would not be an issue but for the 2004presidential election). 
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[93] See U.S. Const. amend. I-X. [94] U.S. Const. amend. IX. [95] See U.S. Const. amend. V, XIV. [96] U.S. Const. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. Const. amend. XXI ("The eighteenth article ofamendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed"). [97] See U.S. Const. amend. XXI. [98] See Richard Hamm, Short Euphorias Followed by Long Hangovers: UnintendedConsequences of the Eighteenth and Twenty-first Amendments, in Unintended Consequences ofConstitutional Amendment 164, 166 (2000) [hereinafter Unintended Consequences] [99] See id. at 167. [100] See id. at 167-68. [101] See id. at 169. [102] See Staff of Senate Subcomm. On the Constitution, Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong.,Amendments to the Constitution: A Brief Legislative History 49-50 [hereinafter Amendments tothe Constitution] [103] See id. at 50. [104] See id. at 50-51. [105] See id. [106] See generally Hamm, supra note 98, at 173-82 (noting several problems with theEighteenth Amendment: widespread noncompliance; the rise of criminal racketeering to satisfythe demand for alcohol; increase in alcoholic consumption among women; and the unwillingnessof states to appropriate resources to enforce compliance). [107] See David Kyvig, Arranging for Amendment: Unintended Outcomes of ConstitutionalDesign, in Unintended Consequences, supra note 98, at 9, 37 (including in its list of interestgroups the Prohibition Party, the Woman's Christian Temperance Union, and the Anti-SaloonLeague of America). [108] See id. 
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[109] Hamm, supra note 98, at 173. [110] See Kyvig, supra note 107, at 37 (including nightclubs, cabarets, and speakeasies). [111] Hamm, supra note 98, at 183 (listing the leading reform organizations responsible forshaping public debate regarding anti-prohibition: the Association Against the ProhibitionAmendment, the Voluntary Committee of Lawyers, and the Women's Prohibition ReformGroup). [112] Id.; Richard Hamm, Shaping the Eighteenth Amendment 231 (Univ. of North CarolinaPress 1995). [113] See Hamm, supra note 98, at 230 (detailing that, in particular, the senator was concernedthat allowing national laws to set social policy would result in the elimination of stateanti-miscegenation laws). [114] Id. at 232-33. [115] Id. at 250. [116] Id. at 223. [117] See Matthew Spalding, In Defense Of Marriage (WebMemo #373), athttp://www.heritage.org/Research/Family/wm373.cfm? (Nov. 19, 2003) (on file with theAmerican University Law Review) (arguing that same-sex marriage will weaken the institutionof marriage by raising non-marital unions to the status of marriage and lowering traditionalmarriage to "merely one form of household"); Robert Benne & Gerald McDermott, SpeakingOut: Why Gay Marriage Would be Harmful, Christianity Today (Feb. 19, 2004), at http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2004/107/41.0.html (on file with the American University LawReview) (citing three negative effects of gay marriage: (1) a scrambling of the definition ofmarriage; (2) the harming of children; and (3) an introduction of instability into marriage andfamily life). See generally The Heritage Foundation, at http://www.heritage.org (last visited Aug.2, 2005). [118] See, e.g., Charisse Jones, Gay Marriage Debate Still Fierce Over One Year Later, USAToday, May 16, 2005, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-05-16-gay-marriage_x.htm (noting that fifty-six percent ofthose polled are opposed to gay marriage); PollingReport.com, Law and Civil Rights, athttp://www.pollingreport.com/civil.htm (last visited July 19, 2005) (on file with the AmericanUniversity Law Review) (publishing Boston Globe poll results finding that fifty percent of thosepolled disapprove of same-sex marriage). But see Jennifer Harper, More Americans Oppose Gay' Marriage,' Poll Finds, Wash. Times, Apr. 2, 2005, at A1 (reporting that sixty-eight percent ofpeople polled think same-sex marriage should not be recognized), available at
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http://www.washingtontimes.com/functions/print.php? StoryID=20050401-114205-2153r. [119] See, e.g., DFW Vending, Inc. v. Jefferson County, 991 F. Supp. 578, 598 (E.D. Tex. 1998)(dismissing the right to consume alcohol as fundamental); Felix v. Milliken, 462 F. Supp. 1360,1385 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Republican Coll. Council of Pa. v. Winner, 357 F. Supp. 739, 740 (E.D.Pa. 1973). [120] See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (declaring that prison inmates retain thefundamental right to marry); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (reaffirming that theright to marry is fundamental); Loving v. Virginia, 338 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (invalidatinganti-miscegenation statute on the grounds that it deprived people of one of the "'basic civil rightsof man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival."). [121] The rhetoric used by the conservatives to support the amendment avoided suggesting theirmotive was prejudice against gay americans. Paul Varnell, Changing Rhetoric on Gay Marriage,Chicago Free Press, June 22, 2005, available athttp://www.indegayforum.org/authors/varnell/varnell157.html ("[O]ne of the most interestingaspects of last year's Senate debate on the so-called Federal Marriage Amendment was therelative absence of overt criticism of gays and lesbians and their relationships. Instead,amendment supporters focused primarily on how the amendment would solidify the associationof parenthood with marriage and would benefit children by assuring them an optimal family oftwo opposite sex parents."). However, motives may be unstated, especially if they would detractfrom the message. See id. (Varnell suggests that the stated rationale is likely disingenuous stating"[a]s Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) expressed it, however disingenuously, 'This amendment is notabout prejudice. It is about safeguarding the best environment for our children."'). Moreover, thestated motives are not adequately supported. In this age of technology, there are a variety of waysfor couples to have children, a husband and wife are not necessary, and given that many gaycouples are parents, allowing gays to marry would not seriously detract from the purportedassociation of parenthood and marriage. Further, there is little, if any uncontroverted evidencethat children are necessarily benefited by opposite-sex parents. See Baehr v. Miike, No. CIV.91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *17-18 (Haw. Cir. Ct., Dec. 3, 1996). [122] During a brief review of a compilation of proposed amendments to the Constitutionbetween 1889 and 1929, no single amendment appears to violate all three basic tenets ofConstitutional democratic principles as flagrantly as the Federal Marriage Amendment. Theauthor grouped the proposed amendments into various categories. Those affecting the form ofgovernment (focusing primarily on procedural changes, term changes, etc.), the powers of thegovernment (the most substantive of the proposed amendments, which focused on variouspowers including war powers, federal taxation, question of aliens, territorial powers, etc.), andthe procedure of constitutional amendments (altering ratification procedures, time for ratification,etc.). See Musmanno, supra note 31, at vii-x. Those that are most closely on point are thoseinvolving marriage, divorce, miscegenation, and prohibition of polygamy. Id. at 104-08, 131-35;see infra Parts II.B-C. 
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[123] See Loving, 388 U.S. at 6 (noting the fifteen states, Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida,Georgia, Kentucky, Louisianna, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, SouthCarolina, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia, which still had anti-miscegenation statutes orconstitutional provisions in force in 1967 (citing Ala. Const. art. 4, § 102, Ala. Code tit. 14, §360 (1958); Ark. Code Ann. §55-104 (1947); Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 101 (1953); Fla. Const.art. 16, § 24, Fla. Stat. § 741.11 (1965); Ga. Code Ann. § 53-106 (1961); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §402.020 (1966); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:79 (1950); Miss. Const. art. 14, § 263, Miss. Code Ann.§ 459 (1956); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 451.020 (1966); N.C. Const. art. XIV, § 8, N.C. Gen. Stat. §14-181 (1953); Okla. Stat. tit. 43, § 12 (1965); S.C. Const. art. 3, § 33, S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7(1962); Tenn. Const. art. 11, § 14, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-402 (1955); Tex. Penal Code Ann 492(Vernon 1952); W. Va. Code Ann. § 4697 (1961)). [124] Denise C. Morgan, Jack Johnson: Reluctant Hero of the Black Community, 32 Akron L.Rev. 529, 546 (1999). [125] See id. at 549 n.78 (citing 69 Cong. Rec. 503 (1912) (statement of Rep. Roddenberry)(stating "[t]hat intermarriage between negroes or persons of color and Caucasians or any othercharacter of persons with the United States... is forever prohibited.")). [126] Morgan, supra note 124, at 549. However, because the amendment prohibited bothvoluntary and coercive interracial relationships, it actually would have constrained a whitewoman's free choice of sexual partners and further protected the white man's exclusive access tothem. Id. [127] See id. at 550-51 (drawing upon the writings of W.E.B. DuBois to summarize the negativeopinion of this proposed amendment in the black community). DuBois wrote: [T]hat anti-miscegenation legislation should be opposed, not because race had nosignificance, but because such laws treated blackness as if it were a physical taint, becausesex out of wedlock was morally repugnant, and because such laws "leave the colored girlabsolutely helpless before the lust of white men." Id. (quoting The Crisis, Feb. 1913, at 180). [128] See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1877) (holding that a state has an "absoluteright to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation... shall be created."). But seeGerard V. Bradley, Law and the Culture of Marriage, 18 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y189, 207- 08 (2004) (concluding that the idea that states have control over the definition andcontrol of marriage is no longer accurate given recent Supreme Court decisions that limit statesand federal legislation meant to curtail the states' power in this area). [129] See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (describing the decision of whether aperson wishes to marry a person of another race as being an individual one upon which the statecannot infringe). 
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[130] See Hamm, supra note 98, at 257 (contending that, even though it is generally thoughtof as a regulationist reform movement, the divorce reform shared many characteristics withprogressive movements including the fact that it began in the 1880s and continued through theprogressive era). [131] See id. (concluding that the supporters of both the divorce reform movement and theprohibition movement "came from the same social background and shared fundamentalassumptions about society"). [132] See id. at 258 ("[b]efore the Civil War, two competing forces, a restrictive tradition thatvirtually prohibited divorce and a popular desire for easier divorce, pulled the American polity indifferent directions over the issue...."). [133] Id. [134] See id. (citing cruelty, misconduct, or long imprisonment as some of the newlyaccepted justifications for divorce in addition to adultery). [135] See id. (classifying this practice as "migratory divorce"). Many western states such asIndiana and Nevada were particularly popular for those seeking divorce. In fact, divorce lawyersfrom these states opened offices in New York to facilitate this process. Id. [136] Hamm, supra note 98, at 259. [137] Id. [138] See id. (noting that most of these proposals never even left committee). [139] See id. (observing that southern congressmen in particular, despite support forrestricting the ability of married couples to divorce, were concerned that any federal legislationon divorce would lead to federal legislation that legitimated interracial marriages). Furthermore,these congressmen, based on the same fear of the legitimization of interracial marriages, arguedthat a federal law without an amendment would be unconstitutional. Id. [140] See Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 605-06 (1906) (holding that a divorce that wasdecreed in Connecticut when the wife was a citizen of New York does not need to necessarily berecognized by the state of New York under the full faith and credit clause); see also Hamm, supranote 98, at 260 (arguing that this approach produced mixed results since, in theory, as long as adivorced couple did not try to remarry in a restrictive state, there was nothing that a state coulddo to question whether a divorce in another state was recognized or not). [141] See Hamm, supra note 98, at 260 (alleging that, because liberal jurisdictions hadcreated a type of tourist industry with the draw being their divorce laws and more conservative
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jurisdictions could preserve the strict divorce laws in their states, there was no way to come to anational consensus on the issue). [142] See Norman W. Spaulding, Constitution as Countermonument: Federalism,Reconstruction, and the Problem of Collective Memory, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1992, 2046-47(2003) (stating that the Corwin Amendment was the original language of the ThirteenthAmendment prior to the start of the Civil War (citing Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 1284(1861)). [143] Id. [144] See id. at 2047 (describing how the Corwin Amendment was the only pre-Civil Warproposal dealing with the issue of slavery to pass both houses of Congress). Furthermore, theamendment was signed by President Buchanan, supported by Abraham Lincoln, and sent to thestates for ratification. However, the compromise amendment was discarded once the Civil Warbegan. Id. at 2047-48. [145] See generally A. Christopher Bryant, Stopping Time: The Pro-Slavery and"Irrevocable" Thirteenth Amendment, 26 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol. 501, 512-34 (2003) (presentingthe historical context and the debate surrounding the Corwin Amendment and describing howthis amendment was really an attempt to prevent the secession that eventually occurred and led tothe Civil War). [146] Brandon, supra note 51, at 233. [147] Id. at 234. [148] Id. [149] See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 397 (1856) (summarizing the defendant's pleawhich contains the allegations that, because the plaintiff was a "negro slave," he was the "lawfulproperty" of the defendant who therefore has a right to restrain him); see also Kaimipono DavidWenger, Slavery as a Takings Clause Violation, 53 Am. U. L. Rev. 191, 239 (2003) (pointing outthat, in North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Virginia, Maryland, and other southern states,property taxes on slaves constituted the largest portion of state property tax income). [150] See Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as Spoken, 104 Yale L.J. 1119, 1176(1995) (concluding that the formulation set forth in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111(1942)--where the Court held that Congress's commerce power allowed the Federal Governmentto regulate the amount of wheat grown for personal use--would surely have placed slavery withinthe reach of Congress's commerce power). But see Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. 449, 505-06(1841) (McLean, J., concurring) (concluding that the federal government had no power underArticle 1, § 8 to regulate the interstate trade of slaves, but rather states had the exclusive power to
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regulate the interstate slave trade). [151] See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 406 (holding that a former slave cannot be made a citizen ofMissouri or any other state and, therefore a former slave is not a citizen of the United States anddoes not have the right to file suit in federal courts). [152] See Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. 82, 93-94 (1850) (holding that the laws of eachindividual state, and not the laws of other states, determine whether one is a slave); see alsoCommonwealth v. Aves, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193, 215 (1836) (affirming that, although slaverymay be "contrary to natural right, to the principles of justice, humanity and sound policy," slaveryis not contrary to the laws of the nation and thus states are bound to respect each other's slaverylaws). [153] See supra notes 146-149 and accompanying text. [154] See supra note 150 and accompanying text (hypothesizing that, based on the moremodern interpretation of the Commerce Clause, federal regulation of slavery would have beenwithin Congress's powers). [155] See supra note 151 (concluding, based on the Supreme Court decision in Dred Scott,that former or current slaves were not considered U.S. citizens and did not have the rights andprivileges that arise from citizenship). [156] See Strader, 51 U.S. at 93-94 (holding that state laws alone determine the status ofslavery and slaves and thus, once a lower court determines that a state law makes a person aslave, "their judgment upon this point is... conclusive upon this court, and we have nojurisdiction over it."). [157] See H.R.J. Res. 10, 109th Cong. (2005) (proposing the addition of an amendment tothe Constitution which would state, "[t]he Congress shall have power to prohibit the physicaldesecration of the flag of the United States"); see also S.J. Res. 12, 109th Cong. (2005). TheHouse approved this language on June 22, 2005, by a vote of 286-130. 151 Cong. Rec. H4904,H4927-28 (daily ed. June 22, 2005). As of publication, the bill is currently awaitingconsideration by the Senate. [158] 491 U.S. 397 (1989). [159] 496 U.S. 310 (1990). [160] See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 420 (holding that neither the state's "interest in preserving theflag as a symbol" nor its "interest in preventing breaches of the peace" justifies a criminalconviction for burning the flag because it is an act of political expression). 
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[161] See Eichman, 496 U.S. at 319 ("Punishing desecration of the flag dilutes the veryfreedom that makes this emblem so revered, and worth revering."). [162] See supra note 157. [163] See Eichman, 496 U.S. at 318 (acknowledging that Congress purportedly found anational consensus favoring prohibition on flag burning). [164] See id. at 315 (observing that the government must, and in fact did, concede thatburning the flag constitutes expressive conduct). [165] See id. at 318 (rejecting the idea that the government has greater flexibility insuppressing speech as public opposition to that speech grows). [166] See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420-21 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring)(recognizing that this case is a rare time where it is appropriate to recognize personal distaste fora result that is "right" according to the principles of the Constitution). [167] See 151 Cong. Rec. H4904, H4927-28 (daily ed. June 22, 2005)   (containing the mostrecent House vote approving the flag-burning amendment by a vote of 296-130); see also MikeAllen, House Passes Constitutional Amendment to Ban Flag Burning, Wash. Post, June 23, 2005,at A5 (announcing that the flag-burning amendment was passed in the House of Representativeson June 22, 2005).  This was the fifth time that the amendment has passed the House and there isa new chance that the amendment may pass in the Senate where it has narrowly been defeatedeach of the previous four times.  Id. [168] See generally Rosen, supra note 63, at 1088-92 (concluding that the flag-burningamendment was not only objectionable, but was actually unconstitutional because it would limitotherwise inalienable rights); see also U.S. Const. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of speech...."). [169] See Isaacson, supra note 80, at 600 (arriving at the conclusion that the flag-burningamendment would not only restrict freedom, but it would not accomplish its purpose). Thisconclusion is reached through the reasoning that, because the legally appropriate method ofdisposing of a torn or soiled flag is to burn it, all that a protester would have to do is find such aflag to burn. Id. at 584-87. [170] See Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938) (stating that freedom of speechis a fundamental personal right and liberty); see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (asserting that the Founding Fathers "believed that freedom tothink as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spreadof political truth."); Tribe, supra note 36, at 785-89 (describing free speech as a "basic element ofour fundamental law" and outlining the basic elements of several theories which support the
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significance of free speech). These theories included the necessity of free speech in maintainingthe "marketplace of ideas," "self-government," and definition of personal and group identity. Id. [171] But see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that, "[t]he freedom tomarry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuitof happiness by free men."). [172] See Goodridge v. Dep't of Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003) (holding thatlimiting marriage to only opposite-sex couples violates "the basic premises of individual libertyand equality"). [173] See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (finding that the historysurrounding the adoption of the First Amendment rejects obscenity as "utterly without redeemingsocial importance."). [174] See Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 255-57 (1952) (observing that every state hasmade libel a crime and, like other forms of speech not protected by the Constitution, it is "of suchslight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearlyoutweighed by the social interest in order and morality."). [175] See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (defining "fightingwords" as "those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breachof the peace."). [176] But see Isaacson, supra note 80, at 563 (arguing that, because of the vagueness of theterm "desecration" and the undetermined scope of that word, the use of the word in theamendment invites limitations on more forms of speech than contemplated). [177] See supra notes 168-170 and accompanying text. [178] See Federal Marriage Amendment, H.R.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003) (as originallyintroduced, May 21, 2003) (proposing the initial language of the FMA). The marriage amendment was first drafted as follows: Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman. Neitherthis constitution or the constitution of any state, nor state or federal law, shall be construed torequire that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon unmarried couplesor groups. Id. Not only would this language deprive same-sex couples of the right to marry but itsuggests that any status granted same-sex couples resembling marriage would be unconstitutionalas well. The language was then amended to read: Marriage in the United States shall consist solely of the union of a man and a woman. Neitherthis Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be construed to require that marriageor the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other than the union of a man and a
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woman. Federal Marriage Amendment, H.R.J. Res. 106, 108th Cong. (2004) (as amended, Sept. 23,2004). This new language defines marriage as the union of a man and a woman but does notprevent other recognition of same-sex couples. Thus, states are free to grant marital benefits tosame-sex couples, as Vermont has done, by creating civil unions or domestic partnerships. See1999 Vt. Acts & Resolves 847 (2000) (codified as Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (2000))(creating the institution of a civil union and defining civil unions as being between people of thesame sex who are otherwise excluded from marriage laws). Under the proposed amendment,states can prevent same sex couples from marrying. The only difference is the name. [179] See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976) ("The men who met in Philadelphia inthe summer of 1787 were practical statesmen, experienced in politics, who viewed the principleof separation of powers as a vital check against tyranny."). [180] See U.S. Const. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in aCongress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.");see also Questions, supra note 3, at 211-12 (extolling the ability of the legislature to include alarge number of individuals and diverse people and thoughts into the lawmaking process, thusmaximizing democracy and accountability). [181] See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President ofthe United States of America."); see also Questions, supra note 3, at 211 (emphasizing that theindividual serving as the executive represents the most efficient and rational way to achievecertain objectives and policy outcomes). [182] See U.S. Const. art. III. [183] See Questions, supra note 3, at 218 (noting that the judiciary is "not intended to beaccountable to the people," but rather is the only branch that protects the interests of the minorityof the people from discrimination). [184] Id. at 212. [185] See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177-78 (1803) ("[I]t is emphatically the provinceand duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."). Interestingly, several amendments tothe Constitution have been proposed to alter the Supreme Court's authority in this area; not onehas succeeded. Musmanno, supra note 31, at 92-95. Yet another arguably unconstitutional bill inflagrant violation of Marbury was introduced in the House in 2004 to allow Congress, if twothirds of each House agree, to reverse the judgments of the U.S. Supreme Court concerning theconstitutionality of an Act of Congress. Congressional Accountability for Judicial Activism Actof 2004, H.R. 3920, 108 Cong. (2004). [186] See Thomas Baker, Towards a "More Perfect Union": Some Thoughts on Amending
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the Constitution, 10 Widener J. Pub. L. 1, 9 n.37 (2000) ("Three other amendments could beunderstood to impliedly reject earlier Supreme Court understandings of the Constitution: TheSeventeenth Amendment (1913) (direct election of Senators); the Nineteenth Amendment (1920)(women's suffrage); and the Twenty-Fourth Amendment (1964) (abolition of poll taxes in federalelections)."). [187] 2 U.S. 419 (1793). [188] The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments are referred to as the Civil WarAmendments and were adopted, at least in part, in response to the Dred Scott decision. SeeBaker, supra note 186, at 8. The Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery and the FourteenthAmendment granted citizenship to the slaves, stating "all persons born or naturalized in theUnited States... are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." U.S.Const. amend. XIV. [189] 60 U.S. 393 (1856). [190] 158 U.S. 601 (1895). [191] 400 U.S. 112 (1970). [192] U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. [193] Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 432 (1793) ("A general question of great importancehere occurs. What controversy of a civil nature can be maintained against a State by anindividual?"). [194] Id. at 455 (finding that a state is much like a person in that it can be bound by contract,incur debts, own property, etc.). [195] Amendments to the Constitution, supra note 102, at 14. [196] U.S. Const. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construedto extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United Statesby Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."). [197] See Harold H. Bruff, On the Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies, 36Am. U. L. Rev. 491, 503 (1987) (defining this phenomenon as the "aggrandizement" problem). [198] See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 406-07 (1856). [199] See, e.g., id. at 410 (finding that if the Constitution included African-Americans ascitizens then many of the slave-owning founders acted in flagrant violation of their own
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document); id. at 416-17 (recognizing that the large southern states could not have possiblymeant to include slaves within the meaning of the word "citizen"). [200] Id. at 404. [201] Id. at 438-39. [202] Id. at 405. [203] G. Edward White, The Constitutional Journey of Marbury v. Madison, 89 Va. L. Rev.1463, 1510 (2003). [204] Id. (quoting Benjamin C. Howard). [205] See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 426 (noting that African slaves are an "unfortunate race"). [206] Id. [207] William G. Ross, Judicial Review: Blessing or Curse? or Both? A Symposium inCommemoration of the Bicentennial of Marbury v. Madison, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 733, 762(2003) (stating that people are increasingly reliant on federal power to protect personal libertiesinvolving speech, religion, and sexual orientation). [208] U.S. Const. amend. XXVI. [209] Amendments to the Constitution, supra note 102, at 90. [210] The Amendments also barred the use of literacy tests in all state and federal electionsfor a period of five years, which was based on a congressional finding that such tests were usedto discriminate against voters based on color. The Amendments further forbade the states fromdisqualifying voters for presidential and vice presidential elections because they had not met stateresidency requirements. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285 (1970). [211] Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117 (1970). [212] Id. at 125 (noting that Congress is the final authority in regulating federal elections). [213] Id. (interpreting U.S. Const. art. I, §§ 2, 4). Justice Douglas, in concurrence, added thatthe Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment supplied additional justification forthe holding that it was unfair to deny the right to vote to individuals who could fight in wars. Id.at 141-42 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Harlan, concurring in part and dissenting in part,argued that the power to set voter qualifications for national elections was expressly committedto the states by article I, §§ 1 and 2 and the Fourteenth Amendment did not grant the federal
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government the power to alter that without an express constitutional amendment. Id. at 201(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Harlan criticized the majority fordisregarding the express intent and understanding of the Framers and invading the area to whichArticle V is committed. Id. [214] Amendments to the Constitution, supra note 102, at 90. [215] Id. [216] In fact, opponents of gay marriage in Massachusetts filed a bill seeking to removeSupreme Judicial Court Justice Margaret Marshall from the bench after a similar bill targeting allfour Massachusetts justices who voted to legalize gay marriage was proposed. Opponents of gaymarriage file bill to remove SJC chief justice, Associated Press, Boston, May 25, 2004 (on filewith the American University Law Review). [217] See Laurence Friedman, Symposium on Goodridge v. Department of Public Health:The (Relative) Passivity of Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 14 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 1,22-25 (concluding that the decision in Goodridge is a narrow decision that does not constitutejudicial activism). See generally Goodridge v. Dep't of Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003). [218] See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 968. [219] See id. at 963 (recognizing that, among other things, same-sex couples are denied taxbenefits of opposite-sex married couples and must undergo the difficult process of second-parentadoption). [220] See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (declaring that Virginia'santi-miscegenation statutes violated the Twenty-Fourth Amendment). [221] Id. [222] See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 508 (1999) (Article I of the Constitution grantsCongress broad power to legislate in certain areas. Those legislative powers are, however, limitednot only by the scope of the Framers' affirmative delegation, but also by the principle "that theymay not be exercised in a way that violates other specific provisions of the Constitution."(quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968)). [223] Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895). [224] Id. at 634-35. [225] Amendments to the Constitution, supra note 102, at 42. 
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[226] U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. [227] Pollock, 158 U.S. at 635. [228] U.S. Const. amend. XVI. [229] See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 (delineating the specific powers of Congress); U.S. Const.art. II, § 2 (delineating the specific powers of the President); U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; U.S. Const.amend. X (delineating the specific powers of the Judiciary). [230] See Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 823 (1990) (noting that theConstitution created a system of dual sovereignty). [231] See U.S. Const. amend. X. [232] See New State Ice. Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,dissenting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous statemay, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experimentswithout risk to the rest of the country."). [233] See Peter A. Lauricella, The Real "Contract with America": The Original Intent of theTenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause, 60 Alb. L. Rev. 1377, 1381 (1997) ("[B]ecausethe geographical area of a state is smaller than that of the federal government, people who findstate policies and regulations burdensome could 'vote with their feet,' and move to a differentstate."). [234] U.S. Const. art. VI (highlighting the Supremacy Clause). [235] See Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8 (1995) ("[S]tate courts are absolutely free tointerpret state constitutional provisions to accord greater protection to individual rights than dosimilar provisions of the United States Constitution."). [236] See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in partand dissenting in part) (citing numerous incidents in which states have pioneered policies, likethe minimum wage in Massachusetts, that eventually became national policy). [237] See In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890) ("The whole subject of the domesticrelations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the states, and not to thelaws of the United States."); see also Scott Ruskay-Kidd, The Defense of Marriage Act and theOverextension of Congressional Authority, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1435, 1467 (1997). [238] See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619 n.8 (2000) ( "With its carefulenumeration of federal powers and explicit statement that all powers not granted to the Federal
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Government are reserved, the Constitution cannot realistically be interpreted as granting theFederal Government an unlimited license to regulate."); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,577 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Were the Federal Government to take over the regulationof entire areas of traditional state concern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation ofcommercial activities, the boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority wouldblur and political responsibility would become illusory."). Interestingly, in 1884 the first attemptto give Congress the power to make uniform marriage and divorce laws was made, followed byfifty-nine proposed amendments toward that end. Edwin Stein, Past and Present ProposedAmendments to the United States Constitution Regarding Marriage, 82 Wash. U. L.Q. 611, 637,666 app. (2004). All, of course, have failed, as an extreme encroachment on states' powers. Id. at638, 664-65. [239] See generally Kristian D. Whitten, Section Three of the Defense of Marriage Act: IsMarriage Reserved to the States?, 26 Hastings Const. L.Q. 419 (1999) (concluding that Congressdoes not have the power to impose its definition of marriage on the states). [240] See Goodridge v. Dep't of Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (2003) (distinguishing civil andreligious marriages); see also Note, Litigating the Defense of Marriage Act: The NextBattleground for Same-Sex Marriage, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 2684, 2704-05 (2004) (stating that thegovernment's ability to regulate marriage is limited to civil, as opposed to religious, marriages). [241] See Letter from Dennis W. Archer, President, American Bar Association, to U.S.Senators (July 9, 2004) (on file with the American University Law Review) ("If the Constitutionis to continue to embody the spirit of liberty for future generations, we must not seek to use it toenshrine still-evolving societal views."), available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/108th/cam070904.pdf. [242] See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 n.5 (1967) (naming the fifteen states which stillhad anti-miscegenation statutes or constitutional provisions in force in 1967). [243] See Bailey v. Fiske, 34 Me. 77, 77 (1852) (nullifying a fifty-nine year marriagebetween a white woman and a mulatto); see also Keith E. Sealing, Blood Will Tell: ScientificRacism and the Legal Prohibitions Against Miscegenation, 5 Mich. J. Race & L. 559, 592-97(2000) (describing the history of courts upholding the constitutionality of anti-miscegenationstatutes prior to 1967). [244] See Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d 17, 29 (Cal. 1948) (finding the statute unconstitutionalunder the California state constitution); see also Sealing, supra note 243, at 593 n.239 (notingthat the Alabama Supreme Court was actually the very first to overturn an anti-miscegenationstatute in Burns v. State, 48 Ala. 195 (1872), but the decision was overruled in Green v. State, 58Ala. 190 (1877)). [245] See Loving, 388 U.S. at 6 n.5 ("Over the past 15 years, 14 States have repealed laws
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outlawing interracial marriages: Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Maryland,Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming."). [246] See id. at 12 (finding that the state statutes violated the Due Process and EqualProtection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment). [247] For a more detailed discussion of the proposed amendment, see supra Part III.B. [248] William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Nan D. Hunter, Sexuality, Gender and the Law 1064 (2d ed.2004). [249] Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810(1972). [250] See, e.g., Dean v. Dist. of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 308 (D.C. 1995) (affirming denialof marriage license to two gay men); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973)(holding that two women are "incapable" of being married); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1197(Wash. App. 1974), review dismissed, 84 Wash.2d 1008 (1974) (denying marriage license tosame-sex couple). [251] Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). [252] Baehr v. Miike, No. CIV. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). [253] Baehr v. Miike, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997). [254] Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 572C (2004). [255] Brad K. Gushiken, The Fine Line Between Love and the Law: Hawaii's Attempt toResolve the Same-Sex Marriage Issue, 22 U. Haw. L. Rev. 149, 165 (2000). [256] Haw. Const. art. I, § 23. This constitutional amendment is arguably suspect for many ofthe same reasons articulated in this Article. Of course, federalism principles are not invokedwhen dealing with a state statute but individual rights and separation of powers principles clearlyare. The political branches in Hawaii used the amendment process to overturn a judicial decisionthat had protected the interests of a small minority and enshrined prejudice in the stateconstitution. See generally David Orgon Coolidge, The Hawai'i Marriage Amendment: ItsOrigins, Meaning and Fate, 22 U. Haw. L. Rev. 18, 70-82 (2000) (detailing the legislative actionleading to the approval of the 1998 Marriage Amendment). [257] See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 869-70 (Vt. 1999) (noting that the marriage laws"effectively exclude[d] them from a broad array of legal benefits and protections incident to themarital relation, including access to a spouse's medical, life, and disability insurance, hospital
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visitation and other medical decisionmaking privileges, spousal support, intestate succession,homestead protections, and many other statutory protections."). [258] Id. at 867. [259] See id. at 886 (leaving the issue of a same-sex couple's right to a marriage license foranother day). [260] Id. [261] Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (2004). [262] Recently California and New York trial courts have held their state marriage lawsdepriving same-sex couples a marriage license unconstitutional under their state constitutions.See In re Coordination Proceeding, Special Title [Rule 155(c)], 2005 WL 583129 (Cal. Sup. Ct,2005); Hernandez v. Robles, 7 Misc.3d 459 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005). But see Seymour v. Holcomb,790 N.Y.S.2d 858 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) ("the limitation of marriage licenses to opposite sexcouples does not violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights"). [263] Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309, 343-44 (2003). [264] See In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 570 (Mass. 2004)(finding that there was no rational basis for distinguishing between "civil marriages" and "civilunions" where the only difference between the licensure programs was the sexual orientation ofthe recipients). [265] Id. at 568. [266] See Rick Klein, Vote Ties Civil Unions to Gay-Marriage Ban: Romney to Seek Stay ofSJC Order, Boston Globe, Mar. 30, 2004, at A1 (explaining that the Attorney General ofMassachusetts refused to take the Governor's request to the Supreme Judicial Court because hebelieved it lacked legal merit). Moreover, some citizens requested an injunction in federal courtand were also denied. Largess v. Supreme Judicial Court for State of Mass., 313 F. Supp. 2d 77(D. Mass. 2004), aff'd, 373 F.3d 219 (1st Cir. 2004). [267] See Fred Bayles, Mass. to Allow Gay Marriage Today, USA Today, May 17, 2004, atA1 (reporting that thousands of homosexual couples in Massachusetts were expected to apply formarriage licenses). [268] Justice Brandeis stated many years ago that to deny the states the right to experimentwith social institutions is "fraught with serious consequences to the Nation." New State Ice Co. v.Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Section of Family LawWorking Group on Same-Sex Marriages and Non-Marital Civil Unions, American Bar
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Association, A White Paper: An Analysis of the Law Regarding Same-Sex Marriage, CivilUnions, and Domestic Partnerships passim (2004) (analyzing the issues surrounding same-sexunions throughout the country and contending that the states are best suited to vigorously addressthe issues); Dennis Archer, Why Congress Should Back Off Gay Marriage Law: It Tramples onthe Traditional Authority of Each State to Establish its Own Laws, Chi. Sun-Times, Op-ed, July14, 2004 (providing a warning of the dangerous impact a constitutional amendment on same-sexmarriage would have on the federalist structure of our government), available athttp://www.suntimes.com. [269] See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877) ("The several States are of equal dignityand authority, and the independence of one implies the exclusion of power from all others. Andso it is laid down... that the laws of one State have no operation outside its territory, except so faras is allowed by comity...."). [270] See Susan Milligan, Lawmakers Voice Concerns for States' Rights, Boston Globe, Feb.25, 2004 ("Many senators and House members said they are distressed about the domino effect ofthe Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision requiring the state to sanction same-sexmarriages, and worried aloud that 'activist judges' would demand that all states recognize gayunions made in Massachusetts beginning in May and others licensed recently in San Franciscoand Bernalillo, N.M., contrary to state laws."), available at http://www.boston.com/news/specials/gay_marriage/articles/2004/02/25/lawmakers_voice_concern_for_states_rights/. [271] In fact, a 1913 Massachusetts statute is being used to prevent out-of-state couples fromgetting married in Massachusetts. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 207, § 12 (1913) ("Legal ability ofnon-residents to marry; duty of licensing officer to ascertain: Before issuing a license to marry aperson who resides and intends to continue to reside in another state, the officer having authorityto issue the license shall satisfy himself, by requiring affidavits or otherwise, that such person isnot prohibited from intermarrying by the laws of the jurisdiction where he or she resides."). [272] U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the publicActs, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State."). [273] See, e.g., Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 584-85 (1951) (stating that the FullFaith and Credit clause gives states power over their own courts, but demands that they respectthe decisions of courts in other states). [274] U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. [275] See, e.g., Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 501(1939) (making an exception for employee compensation statutes); see generally Barbara J. Cox,Same-sex Marriage and the Public Policy Exception in Choice-of-Law: Does it Really Exist?, 16Quinnipiac L. Rev. 61 (1996) (discussing whether same-sex marriages should fit into the public
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policy exception). [276] See Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and Choice-Of-Law: If We Marry in Hawaii,Are We Still Married When We Return Home?, 1994 Wis. L. Rev. 1033, 1110-16 (comparingchoice-of-law treatment with regard to anti-miscegenation statutes to the potential treatment oflegalized same-sex marriages). [277] See, e.g., Developments in the Law, The Law of Marriage and Family, ConstitutionalConstraints on Interstate Same-Sex Marriage Recognition, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2028, 2029,2039-42 (2003) (evaluating the merit of the argument that states may categorically refuse torecognize same-sex marriages consummated in other states based on the public policy exceptionto the Full Faith and Credit clause). [278] 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000) ("No State, territory, or possession of the United States, orIndian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding ofany other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of thesame sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, ortribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship."). [279] See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 741.212 (West 2004) ("Marriages between persons of thesame sex... are not recognized for any purpose in this state."); 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 5/212n.4 (West 1996) ("[S]ame sex marriage is contrary to the public policy of this state.") (internalquotations omitted); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1704 (West 2001) ("A marriage between personsof the same sex... even if valid where entered into, shall be void in this Commonwealth."); Tex.Fam. Code Ann. § 6.204 (Vernon 2003) ("A marriage between persons of the same sex or a civilunion is contrary to the public policy of this state and is void in this state."). For a particularlyfar-reaching statute, see Virginia's recent amendment to its marriage statutes which reads inpertinent part: The General Assembly finds that the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that"A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law." (Atherton v.Atherton, 181 U.S. 155, (1901), reversed on other grounds under Haddock v. Haddock, 201U.S. 562, (1906)). The General Assembly further recognizes that both the United StatesSupreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. ___, 123 S. Ct. 2472, (2003), and theMassachusetts Supreme Court in Goodrich v. Department of Health, SJC 08860, March 4,2003-November 18, 2003, failed to consider the beneficial health effects of heterosexualmarriage, as contrasted to the life-shortening and health compromising consequences ofhomosexual behavior, and this to the detriment of all citizens regardless of their sexualorientation or inclination. The General Assembly hereby concludes that the Commonwealth of Virginia is under noconstitutional or legal obligation to recognize a marriage, civil union, partnership contract orother arrangement purporting to bestow any of the privileges or obligations of marriage under thelaws of another state or territory of the United State unless such marriage conforms to the laws ofthis Commonwealth. 
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H.B. 751, 2004 Sess. (Va. 2004). [280] See Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA: Why the Defense of Marriage Act isUnconstitutional, 83 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 18 (1997) (arguing that DOMA should be struck downbecause it violates the Full Faith and Credit clause of the Constitution); see also Mark Strasser,Baker and Some Recipes for Disaster: On DOMA, Covenant Marriages, and Full Faith andCredit Jurisprudence, 64 Brook. L. Rev. 307, 307-08 (1998) (asserting that DOMA isunconstitutional). [281] Mark Strasser, Loving the Romer Out for Baehr: On Acts in Defense of Marriage and theConstitution, 58 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 279, 279 (1997). [282] Wilson v. Ake, No. 8:04-CV-1680-T-30TBM, 2004 WL 3142528 (M.D. Fl. July 20,2004), argued, Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (2005) (granting defendants' motion todismiss); see Graham Brink, Couple Sues to Recognize Gay Wedding, St. Petersburg Times, July21, 2004, at 1A. [283] Wilson, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 1302. [284] See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 424 (1979) (holding that the Full Faith and CreditClause does not require a forum state to apply another state's laws if such laws violate alegitimate public policy of the forum state); see also Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 426(1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("It is true that the commands of the Full Faith and CreditClause are not inexorable in the sense that exceptional circumstances may relieve a State fromgiving full faith and credit to the judgment of a sister State because 'obnoxious' to an overridingpolicy of its own"); Ralph U. Whitten, The Original Understanding of the Full Faith and CreditClause and the Defense of Marriage Act, 32 Creighton L. Rev. 255, 264 (1998) ("If Congressdoes not provide for the substantive effect that state statutes should have in other states, the stateswould determine these matters for themselves under common-law, conflict-of-laws rulesreflecting accepted relationships between independent sovereigns."). [285] See U.S. General Accounting Office, Defense of Marriage Act: Update to Prior Report(2004) (stating that the U.S. General Accounting Office has counted "1,138 federal statutoryprovisions...in which marital status is a factor in determining or receiving benefits, rights, andprivileges"); see also Religious Tolerance.org, Legal and Economic Benefits of Marriage, athttp:// www.religioustolerance.org/mar_bene.htm (last visited July 17, 2005) (on file with theAmerican University Law Review) (discussing some of the many federal legal rights and benefitscurrently unavailable to same-sex couples). [286] 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000). [287] Strasser, supra note 281, at 279; see Barbara A. Robb, The Constitutionality of the Defenseof Marriage Act in the Wake of Romer v. Evans, 32 New Eng. L. Rev. 263, 342 (1997)
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(concluding that both sections of DOMA are unconstitutional under the equal protectioncomponent of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process clause in light of Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.620 (1996)). [288] See Marriage Protection Act of 2004, H.R. 3313, 108th Cong. (2004) (amending 28 U.S.C.§ 1632 to read "[n]o court created by Act of Congress shall have any jurisdiction, and theSupreme Court shall have no appellate jurisdiction, to hear or decide any question pertaining tothe interpretation of, or the validity under the Constitution of section 1738C of this section."). [289] H.R. 3920, 108th Cong. (2004). [290] See 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (declaring that it is "emphatically the province and duty of thejudicial department to say what the law is"); see also Press Release, Alan Hirsch, WilliamsProject, Off the Court (July 15, 2004), at http://www.law.ucla.edu/williamsproj/press/offthecourthirsch071504.html (on file with the AmericanUniversity Law Review) (noting that proponents of the bill argue that it is constitutional underArticle III as the federal courts' jurisdiction is subject to "such exceptions, and under suchregulations as the Congress shall make" while opponents argue that the "exceptions clause wasnever intended to permit stripping all federal courts of authority to hear cases arising under theConstitution or federal law, especially where fundamental rights are concerned."). See generallyWilliam G. Ross, The Resilience of Marbury v. Madison: Why Judicial Review Has Survived SoMany Attacks, 38 Wake Forest L. Rev. 733 (2003) (commenting on the failure of mostlegislative attempts to curb judicial review as reason for the heated controversies in the judicialappointments process judicial antagonists); Wilfred Feinberg, Constraining the "Least DangerousBranch": The Tradition of Attacks on Judicial Power, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 252 (1984) (discussinglegislative attempts to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts and noting that nearly all havefailed). [291] 74 U.S. 506, 513-14 (1868) (detailing the first Supreme Court case interpreting Congress'spower to limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court). See generally Gordon G. Young, A CriticalReassessment of the Case Law Bearing on Congress's Power to Restrict the Jurisdiction of theLower Federal Courts, 54 Md. L. Rev. 132 (1995) (examining the constitutionality of lawslimiting the jurisdiction of the federal courts). [292] See Cong. Rec. S7998-99 (daily ed. July 13, 2004) (statement of Sen. McCain on Senatefloor during the 2004 debate over the Federal Marriage Amendment) ("The constitutionalamendment we're debating today strikes me as antithetical in every way to the core philosophy ofRepublicans. It usurps from the states a fundamental authority they have always possessed andimposes a Federal remedy for a problem that most states do not believe confronts them...."). 
